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Abstract
In the incremental versions of Facility Location and k-Median, the demand points arrive one at a time and the algorithm maintains
a good solution by either adding each new demand to an existing cluster or placing it in a new singleton cluster. The algorithm can
also merge some of the existing clusters at any point in time.
For Facility Location, we consider the case of uniform facility costs, where the cost of opening a facility is the same for all points,
and present the ﬁrst incremental algorithm which achieves a constant performance ratio. Using this algorithm as a building block,
we obtain the ﬁrst incremental algorithm for k-Median which achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k) medians.
The algorithm is based on a novel merge rule which ensures that the algorithm’s conﬁguration monotonically converges to the
optimal facility locations according to a certain notion of distance. Using this property, we reduce the general case to the special
case when the optimal solution consists of a single facility.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The model of incremental algorithms [4] for data clustering is motivated by practical applications where the demand
sequence is not known in advance and a hierarchical clustering is required. Incremental clustering algorithms maintain a
good solution without ever breaking up any of the existing clusters. In this paper, we consider the incremental version of
metric Facility Location with uniform facility costs and the incremental version of k-Median. The problems of Facility
Location and k-Median ﬁnd many applications in the areas of network design and data clustering and have been the
subject of intensive research over the last decade (see e.g. [20] for a survey and [9] for approximation algorithms and
applications). In addition to the ofﬂine setting, there are many applications where the demand points arrive online and
the solution is constructed incrementally using no information about future demands (see e.g. [18]).
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In Incremental k-Median [6], the demand points arrive one at a time. Each new demand is either added to an existing
cluster or placed in a new singleton cluster upon arrival. At any point in time, the algorithm can also merge some of
the existing clusters. Each cluster is represented by its median whose location is determined at the cluster’s creation
time. When some clusters are merged, the median of the new cluster is selected from the medians of its components.
The goal is to maintain a solution consisting of at most k clusters/medians which minimizes the total assignment cost
of the demands considered so far. The assignment cost of a demand is its distance from the median of the cluster in
which the demand is currently included.
The deﬁnition of Incremental Facility Location is similar. Demand points arrive one at a time and are assigned to
either an existing or a new facility upon arrival. At any point in time, the algorithm can also merge a facility with
another one by closing the ﬁrst facility and reassigning all the demands currently assigned to it to the second facility.
The objective is to maintain a solution which minimizes the sum of facility and assignment costs. As before, the
assignment cost of a demand is its distance from the facility to which the demand is currently assigned.
We evaluate the performance of incremental algorithms using the performance ratio [4]. An incremental algorithm
achieves a performance ratio of c if for all demand sequences, the cost incurred by the algorithm is at most c times the
cost incurred by an optimal ofﬂine algorithm, which has full knowledge of the demand sequence, on the same instance.
Comparison to online and streaming algorithms. Like online algorithms, incremental algorithms commit themselves
to irrevocable decisionsmadewithout any knowledge of future demands.More speciﬁcally, when a new demand arrives,
the algorithmmaydecide to add the demand to an existing cluster ormerge some clusters. These decisions are irrevocable
because once formed, clusters cannot be broken up. In addition, the deﬁnition of the performance ratio is essentially
identical to the deﬁnition of the competitive ratio (see e.g. [3]). Hence, Incremental k-Median can be regarded as the
natural online version of k-Median. However, we have avoided casting Incremental k-Median as “Online k-Median”.
The most important reason is that we are not aware of any simple and natural notion of “irrevocable cost” which could
be associated with the irrevocable decision that a demand is clustered together with some other demands.
Incremental algorithms also bear a resemblance to one-pass streaming algorithms for clustering problems (see e.g.
[12] for a formulation of the streaming model and [11,7] for applications to k-Median). However, in the case of
streaming algorithms, the emphasis is on space and time efﬁcient algorithms which achieve a small approximation
ratio by ideally performing a single scan over the input data. A streaming algorithm for k-Median is not restricted in
terms of the solution’s structure or the set of operations available. On the other hand, incremental algorithms maintain
a good hierarchical clustering by making irrevocable decisions. As for time and space efﬁciency, we only explicitly
require that incremental algorithms should run in polynomial time. Nevertheless, all known incremental algorithms
for clustering problems can be either directly regarded as or easily transformed to time and space efﬁcient one-pass
streaming algorithms (see e.g. [4,11,6,7]).
Previous work. Charikar et al. [4] introduced the framework of incremental clustering and presented incremental
algorithms for k-Center (i.e., minimize the maximum cluster radius) which achieve a constant performance ratio using
k clusters. Charikar and Panigrahy [6] presented an incremental algorithm for Sum k-Radius (i.e., minimize the sum
of cluster radii) which achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k) clusters. They also proved that no determin-
istic algorithm which maintains at most k clusters can achieve a performance ratio better than (k) for Incremental
k-Median. The argument of [6] can be generalized and show that for every  > 0, any deterministic algorithm which
maintains at most (1 + )k medians must have a performance ratio of (1/). Determining whether there exists an
incremental algorithm for k-Median which achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k) medians is suggested as
an open problem in [6].
The only known incremental algorithms for k-Median are the one-pass streaming algorithms of [11,7]. More specif-
ically, the streaming algorithms of Guha et al. [11] can be regarded as incremental algorithms under the assumption
that the number of demands n is known in advance. For k much smaller than n, their algorithms achieve a performance
ratio of 2O(1/) using n medians and run in O(nk poly(log n)) time and n space. The best known streaming algorithm
for k-Median is the one-pass algorithm of Charikar et al. [7]. Under the assumption that n is known in advance, this
algorithm can be easily transformed to an incremental algorithm which achieves a constant performance ratio with
high probability (whp 1 ) using O(k log2 n) medians and runs in O(nk log2 n) time and O(k log2 n) space.
The only known incremental algorithms for Facility Location are the online algorithms of [18,8,1]. Meyerson [18]
was the ﬁrst to consider the online version of Facility Location, where the demand points arrive one at a time and are
1 Throughout this paper, “whp” means “with probability at least 1 − O(1/n)”.
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irrevocably assigned to either an existing or a new facility upon arrival. In [18], a randomized O( log nlog log n )-competitive
algorithm and a lower bound of(1) are presented. In [8], the lower bound is improved to( log nlog log n ) and a deterministic
O( log nlog log n )-competitive algorithm is given. A simpler and faster deterministic algorithm is presented in [1]. However,
this algorithm works only for d-dimensional Euclidean spaces and is (2d log n)-competitive.
The lower bounds of [18,8] hold only if the decision of opening a facility at a particular location is irrevocable.
Hence, they do not apply to the incremental version of Facility Location. However, the lower bound of [8] implies that
any algorithm which maintains o(k log n) facilities incurs a total initial assignment cost 2 of (1) times the optimal
cost. Therefore, an algorithm treating the merge operation as a black-box cannot approximate the optimal assignment
cost within a constant factor unless it uses(k log n) facilities (see e.g. the algorithm of [7]). In other words, to establish
a constant performance ratio, one should prove that merge operations can also decrease the algorithm’s assignment
cost.
Related work on Facility Location and k-Median. In the ofﬂine case, where the demand set is fully known in advance,
there are constant factor approximation algorithms for Facility Location based on Linear Programming rounding (see
e.g. [21,22]), local search (see e.g. [15,5,2]), and the primal-dual method (see e.g. [14,13]). The best polynomial-time
algorithm known achieves an approximation ratio of 1.52 [16], while no polynomial-time algorithm can achieve an
approximation ratio less than 1.463 unless NP = DTIME(nO(log log n)) [10]. For k-Median, the best known polynomial-
time algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of 3 + o(1) [2], while no polynomial-time algorithm can achieve an
approximation ratio less than 1+ 2/e unless NP = DTIME(nO(log log n)) [13]. As it is also observed in [18], our setting
should not be confused with the setting of [17,19], where the demand set is fully known in advance and the number of
facilities/medians increases online.
Contribution. We present the ﬁrst incremental algorithm for metric Facility Location with uniform facility costs
which achieves a constant performance ratio. The algorithm combines a simple rule for opening new facilities with a
novel merge rule based on distance instead of cost considerations. We use a new technique to prove that a case similar
to the special case where the optimal solution consists of a single facility is the dominating case in the analysis. This
technique is also implicit in [8] and may ﬁnd applications to other online problems. To overcome the limitation imposed
by the lower bound of [8], we also establish that in the dominating case, merge operations decrease the total assignment
cost.
Using the algorithm for Facility Location as a building block, we obtain the ﬁrst incremental algorithm for k-Median
which achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k) medians. Thus, we resolve the open question of [6] and
improve the number of medians required for a constant performance ratio from O(k log2 n) to O(k). Our algorithm is
deterministic, runs in O(n2k) time and O(n) space, and is the ﬁrst incremental algorithm for k-Median which does not
assume any advanced knowledge of n.
Combining our techniques with the techniques of [7], we obtain a randomized algorithm which achieves a constant
performance ratio whp using O(k) medians. The algorithm is essentially an one-pass streaming algorithm for k-Median
and runs in O(nk2 log2 n) time and O(k2 log2 n) space.
Notation. Throughout this paper, we consider unit demands and allow multiple demands to be located at the same
point. We use n to denote the total number of demands. For Incremental Facility Location, we restrict our attention to
the special case of uniform facility costs, where the cost of opening a facility, denoted by f, is the same for all points.
We use the terms facility, median, and cluster interchangeably.
A metric space M = (M, d) is usually identiﬁed by its point set M. The distance function d is nonnegative,
symmetric, and satisﬁes the triangle inequality. For a subspace M ′ ⊆ M , D(M ′) = maxu,v∈M ′ {d(u, v)} denotes the
diameter ofM ′. For a pointu ∈ M and a subspaceM ′ ⊆ M , d(M ′, u) = minv∈M ′ {d(v, u)} denotes the distance between
u and the nearest point in M ′. It is d(∅, u) = ∞. For subspaces M ′,M ′′ ⊆ M , d(M ′,M ′′) = minu∈M ′′ {d(M ′, u)}
denotes the minimum distance between a point in M ′ and a point in M ′′. For a subspace M ′ ⊆ M , sep(M ′) =
d(M ′,M \M ′) denotes the distance separating the points in M ′ from the points not in M ′. It is sep(∅) = sep(M) = ∞.
For a point u ∈ M and a nonnegative number r, Ball(u, r) denotes the ball of center u and radius r, Ball(u, r) = {v ∈
M : d(u, v)r}.
Organization. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the incremental algorithm for facility location.
After the algorithm has been formulated, we establish its basic properties in Section 2.2. The algorithm’s facility cost
2 The initial assignment cost of a demand is its distance from the ﬁrst facility to which the demand is assigned.
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is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the algorithm’s assignment cost. After a brief sketch
of the main idea, we introduce the basic notions and present an overview of the analysis in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
respectively. Then, we embark on proving the main technical lemmas (Lemma 31 in Section 4.4 and Lemma 34 in
Section 4.5) used in the analysis of the algorithm’s assignment cost. In Section 4.6, we develop a formal potential
function argument which combines the different parts of the proof and establishes that the algorithm’s assignment cost
is within a constant factor of the optimal cost. Section 5 is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the incremental
algorithm for k-Median. The main idea and the deterministic version of the algorithm are presented in Section 5.1.
In Section 5.2, we show how randomization can substantially improve the running time and space efﬁciency of the
algorithm.
2. An incremental algorithm for Facility Location
The algorithm Incremental Facility Location (IFL) is presented in Fig. 1. The algorithm maintains a facility
conﬁguration F, a merge conﬁguration consisting of a merge ball Ball(w,m(w)) for each facility w ∈ F , and the
set L of unsatisﬁed demands.
We use a simpliﬁed version of the deterministic algorithm of [8] for opening new facilities. The notion of unsatisﬁed
demands (the setL) ensures that each demand contributes to the facility cost atmost once.A demand becomes unsatisﬁed
and is added to L upon arrival. Each unsatisﬁed demand holds a potential always equal to its distance from the nearest
facility. If the neighborhood Bu of a new demand u has accumulated a potential of f , a new facility located at u opens.
Then, the unsatisﬁed demands in Bu lose their potential, become satisﬁed, and are removed from L.
Each facility w ∈ F maintains the set C(w) of the demands currently assigned to w and the set Init(w) ⊆ C(w) of
the demands initially assigned to w. The demands in Init(w) are assigned to w when they arrive, while the demands in
C(w) \ Init(w) have been initially assigned to a facility different from w. Each facility w ∈ F also maintains its merge
radius m(w) and the corresponding merge ball Ball(w,m(w)). The algorithm ensures that w is the only facility in its
merge ball. When w opens, the merge radius of w is initialized to a fraction of the distance between w and the nearest
existing facility. Then, if a new facility w′ is included in w’s merge ball, w is merged with w′. Namely, w is closed
and removed from F, and every demand currently assigned to w is reassigned to w′. In addition, the algorithm keeps
decreasing m(w) to ensure that no merge operation can dramatically increase the total assignment cost of the demands
in Init(w). More speciﬁcally, the algorithm maintains the invariant that∣∣∣∣Init(w) ∩ Ball
(
w,
m(w)

)∣∣∣∣ · m(w)f. (1)
After the algorithm has updated its conﬁguration, it assigns the new demand to the nearest facility (initial assignment).
We always distinguish between the arrival and the assignment time of a demand because the algorithm’s conﬁguration
may have changed in between.
If the demands considered by IFL occupy m different locations, a crude analysis shows that IFL can be implemented
in O(nm|Fmax|) time and O(min{n,m|Fmax|}) space, where |Fmax| is the maximum number of facilities in F at any
point in time. The remainder of this section and Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For every x18,  4(x+1)
x−8 , and  ∈ [max{ 62−3 , 4}, 5], IFL achieves a constant performance ratio.
2.1. Preliminaries
For an arbitrary ﬁxed sequence of demands, we compare the algorithm’s cost with the cost of a ﬁxed add-optimal
facility conﬁguration. 3 We denote this solution by F ∗ and refer to it as the optimal solution. To avoid confusing the
algorithm’s facilities with the facilities in F ∗, we use the term optimal center, or simply center, to refer to an optimal
facility in F ∗ and the term facility to refer to an algorithm’s facility in F.
The optimal solution F ∗ consists of k centers c1, c2, . . . , ck . Each demand is assigned to the nearest center in F ∗.
For each demand u, cu denotes the optimal center to which u is assigned. We use the clustering induced by F ∗ to map
3 A facility conﬁguration F is add-optimal if its total cost cannot decrease by adding a new facility to F. Formally, for every w, f +∑u d(F ∪
{w}, u)∑u d(F, u).
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Fig. 1. The algorithm Incremental Facility Location (IFL).
the demands and the algorithm’s facilities to optimal centers. In particular, a demand u is always mapped to cu, i.e., the
optimal center u to which is assigned. Similarly, a facility w is mapped to the nearest optimal center, denoted cw. Also,
let d∗u = d(cu, u) = d(F ∗, u) denote the optimal assignment cost of u, let Fac∗ = kf be the optimal facility cost, and
let Asg∗ = ∑u d∗u be the optimal assignment cost.
In addition to x, , and , let  = 3x + 2,  = ( + 2)( + 2), and  = 12 be constants. Let u1, . . . , un be the
demand sequence considered by IFL. We show that after the demand uj has been considered, 1jn, the facility
cost of IFL does not exceed a1 Fac∗ + b1 Asg∗j and the assignment cost of IFL does not exceed a2 Fac∗ + b2 Asg∗j ,
where Asg∗j =
∑j
i=1 d∗ui , and a1 = 1, a2 = 2 ln(32)(5(+ 4)2 + 3), b1 = 3x , and b2 = 4((+ 1)2 + 2) + 14x.
With a more careful analysis, we can improve a2 and b2 to a′2 = 4 log()(12(+ 2)+ 3) and b′2 = (+ 2)(8+ 25).
Moreover, we can remove the assumption that F ∗ is add-optimal by replacing the bound on the algorithm’s assignment
cost with max{a2, b2}(Fac∗ + Asg∗j ) (see also the proof of Lemma 43).
Every time we want to explicitly refer to the algorithm’s conﬁguration (or some function of it) at the moment a
demand is considered (facility opens), we use the demand’s (resp. facility’s) identiﬁer as a subscript. Moreover, we
use the convention that the algorithm ﬁrst updates its conﬁguration and then performs the demand’s initial assignment.
Hence, we distinguish between the algorithm’s conﬁguration at the demand’s arrival and assignment times using
unprimed symbols to refer to the former and primed symbols to refer to the latter time. For example, for a demand u,
Fu (F ′u) is the facility conﬁguration at u’s arrival (resp. assignment) time. Similarly, for a facility w, Fw (F ′w) is the
facility conﬁguration just before (resp. after) w opens. Writing that an existing facility w is merged with a new facility
w′, we mean that the existing facility w is closed and the demands currently assigned to w are reassigned to the new
facility w′ (and not the other way around).
2.2. Basic properties
We ﬁrst prove that each new facility w is signiﬁcantly closer to the nearest optimal center cw than any facility
in Fw.
Lemma 2. Let  4(x+1)
x−8 . Then, for every facility w mapped to cw,
d(cw,w)
d(Fw, cw)
3
.
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Fig. 2. A schematic representation of the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. We start by assuming that there exists a facility w such that d(cw,w) > d(Fw,cw)3 , and we show that this
assumption contradicts the add-optimality of F ∗. Namely, if there exists such a facility w, then
f + ∑
u∈Bw
d(u,w)
∑
u∈Bw
(
1

d(Fw, u) + d(u,w)
)
<
∑
u∈Bw
d∗u. (2)
In other words, we could decrease the total cost of F ∗ by opening a new facility at w.
We recall that Bw is the set of unsatisﬁed demands contributing their potential to the opening cost of w. Intuitively,
since Pot(Bw) = ∑u∈Bw d(Fw, u)f , there are many demands in Bw ⊆ Ball(w, d(Fw,w)x ). On the other hand, there
are no optimal centers in Ball(w, d(cw,w) − ), for arbitrarily small  > 0. If the lemma was false, the former ball
would be much smaller than the latter one and the optimal solution would open a facility in Bw (see also Fig. 2).
For a formal proof of (2), we bound d∗u from below in terms of d(u,w) and d(Fw, u). We recall that for every
u ∈ Bw, d(u,w) d(Fw,w)x . Therefore,
d(u,w) d(Fw,w)
x
 d(cw,w)
x
+ d(Fw, cw)
x
<
4
x
d(cw,w), (3)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that d(w, cw) > d(Fw,cw)3 . In addition, for every u ∈ Bw,
d∗u = d(cu, u)d(cu,w) − d(u,w) > d(cw,w) −
4
x
d(cw,w) = x − 4
x
d(cw,w). (4)
The second inequality follows from (3) and the fact that w is mapped to cw instead of cu. Using (3) and (4), we establish
that u is much closer to w than to any optimal center:
d(u,w) <
4
x
d(cw,w) <
4
x
x
x − 4d
∗
u =
4
x − 4d
∗
u. (5)
We also obtain the following lower bound on d∗u in terms of d(Fw, u).
d(Fw, u)d(Fw, cw) + d(cw,w) + d(u,w) < 4(x + 1)
x
d(cw,w) <
4(x + 1)
x − 4 d
∗
u. (6)
The second inequality follows from (3) and the assumption that d(cw,w) > d(Fw,cw)3 , and the third inequality from (4).
Using inequalities (5) and (6) and assuming that 1 4(x+1)x−4 + 4x−41, we obtain (2), which contradicts the add-optimality
of F ∗. 
The second basic property of IFL is that for every facility w, there will always exist a facility in Ball(w, x
x−3m(w)).
In addition, the demands assigned to w cannot be reassigned to a facility outside Ball(w, x
x−3m(w)). This property
provides a notion of distance (the conﬁguration distance deﬁned in Section 4) according to which the algorithm’s
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conﬁguration monotonically converges to the optimal centers. In addition, it allows us to bound the actual assignment
cost of a demand in the future in terms of its current assignment cost. To establish this property, we need the following
simple proposition.
Proposition 3. Let w be a facility merged with a new facility w′. Then, for every point p, d(w′, p) + x
x−3m(w
′)
d(w, p) + x
x−3m(w).
Proof. Since w is merged with w′, d(w,w′)m(w). Therefore,
d(w′, p) + x
x − 3 m(w
′)  d(w, p) + d(w,w′) + x
x − 3
3
x
d(w,w′)
= d(w, p) +
(
1 + 3
x − 3
)
d(w,w′)d(w, p) + x
x − 3m(w).
The ﬁrst inequality follows from m(w′)m(1)(w′) 3
x
d(w,w′), since w is open when w′ opens. 
Proposition 4. For every facility w, there will always exist a facility in Ball(w, x
x−3m(w)) and each demand
currently assigned to w will remain assigned to a facility in Ball(w, x
x−3m(w)).
Proof. The proof is by induction over a sequence of merge operations. The proposition is true as long as w remains
open. If w is merged with a new facility w′, we inductively assume that the proposition is true for w′. Then, we apply
Proposition 3 for p = w and show that Ball(w′, x
x−3m(w
′)) is included in Ball(w, x
x−3m(w)). 
3. Facility cost
To bound the algorithm’s facility cost, we distinguish between supported facilities, whose opening cost can be
charged to the optimal assignment cost, and unsupported facilities. This distinction is also useful in the analysis of the
assignment cost.
A facility w is supported if Asg∗(Bw) = ∑u∈Bw d∗u 3x f , and unsupported otherwise. Since each demand con-
tributes to the facility cost at most once, the total cost of supported facilities is at most 3x Asg
∗
. We also prove that there
always exists at most one unsupported facility mapped to each optimal center. Therefore, the algorithm’s facility cost
is at most Fac∗ + 3x Asg∗.
Lemma 5. Let w be an unsupported facility mapped to an optimal center cw, and let w′ be a new facility also mapped
to cw. If w′ opens while w is still open, then w is merged with w′.
Proof. We prove that the merge ball of an unsupported facility is large enough to include each new facility also mapped
to the same optimal center. More speciﬁcally, we show that for every unsupported facility w, m(w) 32d(cw,w).
We ﬁrst prove that every unsupported facility w is much closer to the nearest optimal center cw than to any facility
in Fw (Proposition 6). This implies that m(1)(w) 32d(cw,w) (Proposition 7).
Proposition 6. For every unsupported facility w mapped to cw,
d(cw,w) <
4x + 1
3x2
d(Fw,w).
Proof. Since w is an unsupported facility and
∑
u∈Bw d
∗
u <
1
3xf 
1
3x
∑
u∈Bw d(Fw, u), there is at least one demand
u ∈ Bw such that d∗u < 13x d(Fw, u). In other words, there is a demand u in w’s neighborhood which is very close to
some optimal center. By triangle inequality, there is an optimal center very close to w.
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Formally, let u be a demand in Bw such that d∗u < 13x d(Fw, u), and let cu be the optimal center to which u is mapped.
Then,
d(cw,w)  d(cu,w)d(w, u) + d(cu, u) < 1
x
d(Fw,w) + 13x d(Fw, u)
 d(Fw,w)
(
1
x
+ 1
3x
x + 1
x
)
= 4x + 1
3x2
d(Fw,w).
The third inequality follows from d(w, u) 1
x
d(Fw,w), because u ∈ Bw, and d(cu, u) < 13x d(Fw, u). The fourth
inequality follows from d(Fw, u)d(w, u) + d(Fw,w) x+1x d(Fw,w). 
Proposition 7. For every unsupported facility w mapped to cw,
m(1)(w) 32d(cw,w).
Proof. We recall that m(1)(w) is equal to 3
x
d(Fw,w). Therefore,
m(1)(w) = 3
x
d(Fw,w) = 9x4x + 1
4x + 1
3x2
d(Fw,w) >
9x
4x + 1d(cw,w)
3
2
d(cw,w),
where the strict inequality follows from Proposition 6 and the last inequality holds for every x1. 
We also prove that m(2)(w) is at least 32d(cw,w).
Proposition 8. Let  62−3 . For every facility w, m(2)(w) 32d(cw,w).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.More speciﬁcally, we observe thatm(2)(w) cannot become smaller
than 32d(cw,w) unless the number of demands in Ball(w,
3d(cw,w)
2 ) becomes greater than
2f
3d(cw,w) . This contradicts
the add-optimality of F ∗ because for every  62−3 , these demands are closer to each other than to any optimal center
in F ∗.
Formally, we start by assuming that m(2)(w) is less than 32d(cw,w). Let B
(2) = Ball(w, 3d(cw,w)2 )∩ Init(w). By the
deﬁnition of m(2)(w), m(2)(w) can become less than 32d(cw,w), only if |B(2)| · 3d(cw,w)2 > f (see also Fig. 1). We
will show that this inequality implies
f + ∑
u∈B(2)
d(u,w) <
∑
u∈B(2)
(
3
2
d(cw,w) + d(u,w)
)

∑
u∈B(2)
d∗u (7)
which contradicts the add-optimality of F ∗. We ﬁrst observe that
d∗u = d(cu, u)d(cu,w) − d(u,w)d(cw,w) − d(u,w).
Since for every u ∈ B(2), d(u,w) 3d(cw,w)2 , we obtain that: (i) d(cw,w) 22−3d∗u and (ii) d(u,w) 32−3d∗u . Using
(i) and (ii) and assuming that 32
2
2−3 + 32−31, we obtain (7). 
Propositions 7 and 8 imply that the merge radius of an unsupported facility w never becomes less than 32d(cw,w).
In addition, by Lemma 2, d(cw,w′) 13d(Fw′ , cw)
1
3d(cw,w), because w
′ is mapped to cw and w ∈ Fw′ by hypoth-
esis. The lemma follows by observing that d(w,w′)d(cw,w) + d(cw,w′) 43d(cw,w)m(w) and w is merged
with w′. 
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4. Assignment cost
Bounding the algorithm’s assignment cost is technically involved. We ﬁrst distinguish between inner and outer
demands. If the initial assignment cost of a new demand u is within a constant factor of its optimal assignment cost d∗u
(outer demand), then despite the merge operations, the assignment cost of u will remain within a constant factor of d∗u
(Lemmas 28 and 32). The remaining demands (inner demands) are included in small balls around the optimal centers.
Our main concern is to bound the total assignment cost of inner demands throughout the execution of the algorithm.
To provide some intuition, we sketch the analysis in the special case when the optimal solution consists of a single
center c. In this case, we further distinguish between good and bad inner demands. Intuitively, inner demands start
as good ones and remain good as long as their assignment cost converges to their optimal assignment cost. Then,
they become bad and never become good again. While an inner demand remains good, it is charged with its actual
assignment cost. When it becomes bad, it is charged with an irrevocable cost which is an upper bound on its assignment
cost at any future point in time (ﬁnal assignment cost).
Let w be the facility which is currently the nearest one to c (in this special case, w coincides with the most recent
facility to open). A new inner demand is assigned to w because each new facility is much closer to c than any of
the existing facilities and inner demands are included in a small ball around c (Lemma 2). Because of the rule for
opening new facilities, the total initial assignment cost of the inner demands considered while w is the nearest facility
to c cannot exceed f (Lemmas 29 and 30). Let w′ be the ﬁrst new facility to open after w (w′ becomes the nearest
facility to c). If w is merged with w′, the assignment cost of the inner demands assigned to w decreases by a factor of
2 because of Lemma 2. Therefore, the total assignment cost of the inner demands which have always (i.e., from their
arrival time until the present time) been assigned to the nearest facility to c (good inner demands) keeps converging
to their optimal assignment cost. In particular, we prove that the total assignment cost of good inner demands cannot
exceed 2f plus their optimal assignment cost (see also Lemma 31). On the other hand, if w is not merged with w′,
w is a supported facility (Lemma 5) and Asg∗(Bw) 3x f compensates for the (ﬁnal) assignment cost of the good
inner demands assigned to w at the moment w′ opens (these demands become bad). From now on, no additional inner
demands are assigned to w. Therefore, in this special case, the total assignment cost of inner demands always remains
within a constant factor of the total optimal cost.
In the general case when the optimal solution consists of k centers, we show that the algorithm’s performance ratio
is essentially determined by the simple special case above.
4.1. Deﬁnitions and notation
We proceed to formally deﬁne the basic notions used in the analysis of the assignment cost.
4.1.1. Conﬁguration distance
For an optimal center c ∈ F ∗ and a facility w ∈ F , the conﬁguration distance between c and w, denoted by g(c,w),
is g(c,w) = d(c,w) + x
x−3m(w). For an optimal center c ∈ F ∗, the conﬁguration distance of c, denoted by g(c), is
g(c) = min
w∈F{g(c,w)} = minw∈F
{
d(c,w) + x
x − 3 m(w)
}
.
There always exists a facility within a distance of g(c) from c (Proposition 4). In addition, the following proposition
states that the conﬁguration distance is nonincreasing with time.
Proposition 9. For every point p, g(p) = minw∈F {d(w, p) + xx−3m(w)} is nonincreasing with time.
Proof. Let w be a facility in F. As long as w remains open, the quantity d(w, p) + x
x−3m(w) cannot increase
because the algorithm keeps decreasing m(w) to maintain (1). If w is merged with a new facility w′, d(w′, p) +
x
x−3m(w
′)d(w, p) + x
x−3m(w) by Proposition 3. 
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4.1.2. Coalitions
A set of optimal centers K ⊆ F ∗ with representative cK ∈ K forms a coalition as long as g(cK)D(K). A
coalition K breaks (or becomes broken ) as soon as g(cK) < D(K). A coalition K is isolated if g(cK) 13 sep(K)
and non-isolated otherwise, where sep(K) = d(K, F ∗ \ K). Intuitively, as long as K’s diameter is much smaller than
g(cK) (K is a coalition), the algorithm behaves as if K was a single optimal center located at cK . If the algorithm has
a facility which is much closer to K than any other optimal center (K is isolated), then as far as K is concerned, the
algorithm behaves as if there were no optimal centers outside K.
A hierarchical decomposition K of F ∗ is a complete laminar set system 4 on F ∗. Every hierarchical decomposition
of F ∗ contains at most 2 |F ∗| − 1 distinct sets. Given a hierarchical decomposition K of F ∗, we can ﬁx an arbitrary
representative cK for each K ∈ K and regard K as a system of coalitions which hierarchically covers F ∗. Formally,
given a hierarchical decomposition K of F ∗ and the current algorithm’s conﬁguration, a set K ∈ K is an active
coalition if K is still a coalition (i.e., g(cK)D(K)), while every superset of K in K has broken (i.e., for every
K ′ ∈ K,K ⊂ K ′, g(cK ′) < D(K ′)). The current algorithm’s conﬁguration induces a collection of active coalitions
which form a partitioning of F ∗. Since g(cK) is nonincreasing, no coalition which has become broken (isolated) can
become active (resp. non-isolated) again.
Let DN(K) = max{D(K), 13 sep(K)} (recall that sep(K) = d(K, F ∗ \ K)). By deﬁnition, K becomes either
isolated or broken as soon as g(cK) < DN(K). Using [8, Lemma1],we show that there is a hierarchical decomposition
of F ∗ such that no coalition K becomes active before g(cK) < (+ 1)2DN(K).
Lemma 10. For every 12, there is a hierarchical decomposition K of F ∗ such that for each non-isolated active
coalition K ∈ K,
DN(K)g(cK) < (+ 1)2DN(K).
Proof. A hierarchical decomposition K of F ∗ can be represented by the decomposition tree TK, where the nodes of
the tree correspond to the sets in K and there are edges connecting each set with its maximal subsets. The root of TK
corresponds to F ∗ and there is a leaf for each singleton set {c}, c ∈ F ∗. For every K ∈ K different from the root, let
pK denote the immediate ancestor/parent of K in TK.
For the lower bound, we observe that the coalitionK becomes either isolated or broken as soon as g(cK) < DN(K).
For the upper bound, we ﬁrst observe that the root of TK, which corresponds to F ∗, is an isolated coalition. A coalition
K different from the root cannot become active before its parent-coalition pK breaks. Therefore, at the moment K
becomes active, g(cK)d(cK, cpK ) + g(cpK ) < ( + 1)D(pK), The following lemma implies that there exists a
hierarchical decomposition of F ∗ such that 2DN(K) > D(pK).
Lemma 11 (Fotakis [8, Lemma 1]). For every metric space M and every 16, there is a hierarchical decomposition
K of M such that for each set K ∈ K different from M, either D(K) > D(pK)2 or sep(K) > D(pK)4 .
Intuitively, Lemma 11 states that every metric space has a hierarchical decomposition such that each component
either is well-separated or has a large diameter. Well-separated components become isolated coalitions soon after they
have become active, while large diameter components break soon after they have become active. Therefore, no coalition
can become active long before it becomes either isolated or broken.
Let K be the hierarchical decomposition of F ∗ implied by Lemma 11. We conclude the proof of the lemma by
establishing that for every K ∈ K different from the root F ∗, 2DN(K) = 2 max{D(K), 13 sep(K)} > D(pK). If
D(K) >
D(pK)
2 , then 
2DN(K)2D(K) > D(pK). Otherwise, sep(K) > D(pK)4 . Hence,
2DN(K)
2
3
sep(K) >
2
3
D(pK)
4
D(pK)
for every 12. 
4 A set system is laminar if it contains no intersecting pair of sets. The sets K,K ′ form an intersecting pair if neither of K \ K ′, K ′ \ K and
K ∩ K ′ are empty. A laminar set system on F ∗ is complete if it contains F ∗ and every singleton set {c}, c ∈ F ∗.
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In the following, we assume that the set of active coalitions is given by a ﬁxed hierarchical decomposition K of
F ∗ such that for every non-isolated active coalition K, DN(K)g(cK) < ( + 1)2DN(K). We use the notions
of isolated and non-isolated active coalitions to establish a constant performance ratio for the general case when the
optimal solution consists of k centers. More speciﬁcally, we prove that: (i) isolated active coalitions can be analyzed
similarly to the special case when the optimal solution consists of a single center, and (ii) non-isolated active coalitions,
where merge operations do not decrease the assignment cost, can only increase the performance ratio by a constant
additive term. The proof of (i) is based on the deﬁnition of isolated coalitions and the ideas sketched at the beginning
of this section. The proof of (ii) is based on the property that every coalition becomes either isolated or broken soon
after it has become active.
4.1.3. Demands/facilities and coalitions
Each new demand u is mapped to the unique active coalition Ku containing cu when u arrives. If Ku is isolated
(non-isolated) when u arrives, we say that u is a demand of the isolated (resp. non-isolated) active coalition Ku. Each
new facility w is mapped to the unique active coalition containing cw just before w opens. A new demand u makes a
coalition K broken (isolated) if K has been active (non-isolated) before u’s arrival and becomes broken (isolated) before
u’s initial assignment.
For an isolated active coalition K, we use wK to denote the nearest facility to K’s representative cK at any given
point in time. In other words, wK is a function always mapping the isolated active coalition K to the facility in F which
is currently the nearest facility to cK . Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 imply that as long as K is an isolated active coalition,
wK is much closer to cK than to any other facility and converges to cK .
4.1.4. Inner and outer demands
A demand u mapped to a non-isolated active coalition K is inner if d∗u < DN(K), and outer otherwise. Let inN(K)
denote the set of inner demands and outN(K) denote the set of outer demands mapped toK as long asK is a non-isolated
active coalition.
A demand u mapped to an isolated active coalition K is inner if d∗u < 1 max{d(cK,w′K), D(K)}, and outer
otherwise. In this deﬁnition, w′K denotes the nearest facility to cK at u’s assignment time. The characterization of a
demand u as inner or outer is thereby determined according to the updated algorithm’s conﬁguration at u’s assignment
time, in contrast to the active coalition u is mapped to, which is determined according to the algorithm’s conﬁguration
at u’s arrival time. Let inI (K) denote the set of inner demands and outI (K) denote the set of outer demands mapped
to K as long as K is an isolated active coalition.
4.1.5. Good and bad inner demands
The analysis of isolated active coalitions is based on the notion of good and bad inner demands. The set of good
demands of an isolated active coalition K, denoted by GK , consists of the inner demands of K which have always (i.e.,
from their assignment time until the present time) been assigned to wK (i.e., the nearest facility to cK ). GK is empty
as long as K is either not active or non-isolated. We call bad every inner demand of K which is not good.
Each new inner demand mapped to an isolated active coalition K is initially assigned to the nearest facility to cK ,
because this facility is much closer to cK than any other facility. Hence, each new inner demand mapped to K becomes
good and is added to GK . An inner demand remains good until either K breaks or the location of wK changes and the
facility at the former location wK is not merged with the facility at the new location w′K . Then, the demand becomes
bad and can never become good again. Since wK converges to cK , the actual assignment cost of good inner demands
should converge to their optimal assignment cost.
4.1.6. Unsatisﬁed inner demands
The analysis of non-isolated active coalitions is based on the notion of unsatisﬁed inner demands. The set of
unsatisﬁed inner demands of a non-isolated active coalition K, denoted by NK , consists of the inner demands of K
which are currently unsatisﬁed/included in the set L. NK is equal to inN(K) ∩ L as long as K is a non-isolated active
coalition, and empty otherwise.
286 D. Fotakis / Theoretical Computer Science 361 (2006) 275–313
4.1.7. Final assignment cost
Let u be a demand currently assigned to a facility w with merge radius m(w). The ﬁnal assignment cost of u,
denoted by du, is deﬁned as
du =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
{
d(u,w) + x
x − 3 m(w),
(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u
}
if u is mapped to an isolated active coalition K and
w is currently the nearest facility to K ′s representative cK,
d(u,w) + x
x − 3m(w) otherwise.
If a demand u is currently assigned to a facility w, then u will remain assigned to a facility in Ball(w, x
x−3m(w))(Proposition 4). We also prove that if u is mapped to an isolated active coalition K and is currently assigned to wK ,
then u’s assignment cost can never exceed (1+ 1 )max{d(cK,wK), D(K)}+d∗u (Proposition 23). Therefore, the ﬁnal
assignment cost of u according to the current algorithm’s conﬁguration is an upper bound on its actual assignment cost
at any future point in time.
4.2. Overview
With the exception of good demands, each demand is irrevocably charged with its ﬁnal assignment cost at its
assignment time. Then, we do not have to worry about the demand’s actual assignment cost anymore. On the other
hand, we keep track of the actual assignment cost of good demands until they become bad. This is possible because
the good demands of an isolated active coalition K are always assigned to the nearest facility to cK . Good demands are
irrevocably charged with their ﬁnal assignment cost at the moment they become bad.
The ﬁnal assignment cost of outer demands is within a constant factor from their optimal assignment cost (Lemmas
28 and 32). We use a potential function argument to bound the total assignment cost of inner demands.
Each new inner demand mapped to an isolated active coalition K is initially assigned to the nearest facility to cK
(Lemma 27) and becomes a good demand. We prove that the assignment cost of good inner demands never exceeds
O(f ) plus a constant times their optimal assignment cost (Lemma 31). As long asK remains an isolated active coalition,
it holds a credit of O(f ). This credit absorbs the additive term of O(f ) in the assignment cost of good demands.
The good demands of K can become bad because either K breaks or the location of the nearest facility to cK changes
and the facility w at the previous location wK is not merged with the facility w′ at the new location w′K . In the former
case, the additional cost of O(f ) is charged to K’s credit. In the latter case, the facility w is a supported facility and
the additional cost of O(f ) is charged to the optimal assignment cost of the demands contributing to the opening cost
of w (recall that for every unsupported facility w, 3x Asg∗(Bw)f ). We also prove that each supported facility is
charged with the ﬁnal assignment cost of some good demands which become bad at most once (Proposition 25).
The ﬁnal assignment cost of each new inner demand umapped to a non-isolated active coalitionK is at most 5 g′u(cK)
(namely, ﬁve times the conﬁguration distance of cK at u’s assignment time, Lemma 33). If u remains unsatisﬁed at
its assignment time, its ﬁnal assignment cost is charged to the set NK of unsatisﬁed inner demands. We prove that
|NK | · g(cK) never exceeds (+ 4)2f (Lemma 34) and that every time some inner demands of K become satisﬁed,
g(cK) decreases by a constant factor. Since K becomes either isolated or broken after g(cK) has decreased by a factor
of (1 + 1 )2 (Lemma 10), the total ﬁnal assignment cost of the demands in inN(K) is at most O(ln()2f ). This
bound can be improved to O(ln()f ) by a more careful analysis.
4.3. Preliminaries
In this section, we prove several propositions which are repeatedly used in the analysis of isolated and non-isolated
coalitions. In the following, we sometimes say that a facilityw is mapped to an optimal center in a set of optimal centers
K ∈ K instead of simply saying that w is mapped to the coalition K, because we want to also consider facilities which
open either before K becomes active or after K has broken.
The following three propositions justify that the analysis can treat a coalition K as a single optimal center located
at cK .
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Proposition 12. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and let w be a facility mapped to an
optimal center in K. For every x10,
(A) d(cK,w) < 25 max{d(Fw, cK), D(K)}, and(B) g(cK,w) < max{d(Fw, cK), D(K)}.
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 2 and d(cK, cw)D(K). For the second inequality, using m(w) 3x
d(Fw,w), we show that g(cK,w) xx−3d(cK,w) + 3x−3d(Fw, cK). Then, (B) follows from (A). 
Proposition 13. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and let w be an unsupported facility
mapped to an optimal center in K. For every x16, if d(cK,w)D(K), then w is merged with the ﬁrst new facility
which is also mapped to an optimal center in K and opens while w is still open.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5. Using Propositions 7 and 8, and d(cK, cw)D(K), we show
that m(w) 75d(w, cK). Then, the proposition follows from Proposition 12A. 
Proposition 14. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and let w be a facility whose neigh-
borhood Bw includes a demand u such that cu ∈ K and d∗u < 1 max{d(Fw, cK), D(K)}. Then, d(cK,w) <
3
x
max{d(Fw, cK), D(K)}.
Proof. Immediate consequence of: (i) d(cK, cu)D(K), (ii) d(u,w) d(Fw,w)x because u ∈ Bw, and (iii) the upper
bound on d∗u required by the hypothesis of the proposition. 
The following two propositions are used in the analysis of isolated coalitions.
Proposition 15. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and let w be a facility mapped to an
optimal center not in K. If d(Fw, cK) < 13 sep(K), then d(cK,w) > 53d(Fw, cK).
Proof. Consequence of d(cK, cw)sep(K), since cK ∈ K and cw /∈ K , and Lemma 2. 
Proposition 16. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and let w be a facility mapped to an
optimal center not in K. Then, d(cK,w) 12 sep(K).
Proof. It is d(cK,w)d(cw,w) because w is mapped to cw instead of cK , and d(cK, cw)sep(K) because cK ∈ K
and cw /∈ K . 
The following proposition states that if a facility is very close to the representative of a coalition, then either the
facility’s merge radius is large or the coalition has become isolated or broken.
Proposition 17. Let K ∈ K be a set of optimal centers with representative cK , and for some  > 0, let w be a facility
such that d(cK,w) < . For every x18 and 5, if m(w) < (+ 2), then g(cK) < .
Proof. Immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of g(cK) and the choice of  = (+ 2)(+ 2). 
The following four propositions provide useful upper bounds on the demands’ ﬁnal assignment cost.
Proposition 18. Let x9. For every demand u, du2.5f .
Proof. We ﬁrst claim that for every facility w, m(w)f . We observe that |Init(w) ∩ Ball(w, m(w) )|1 because
Init(w) contains the demand which opens the facility w and is located at the same point as w. The claim follows
from (1).
The proposition follows from m(w)f , the fact that the initial assignment cost of every demand is less than f ,
and the deﬁnition of the ﬁnal assignment cost. 
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Proposition 19. Let u be a demand currently assigned to a facility w, and let c be an optimal center in F ∗. Then,
dud(c, u) + g(c,w).
Proof. Immediate consequence of dud(u,w) + xx−3m(w) and the deﬁnition of g(c,w). 
Proposition 20. Let u be a demand initially assigned to a facility w. For every x9, du4 d(F ′u \ {w}, u).
Proof. Recall that F ′u is the (updated) algorithm’s facility conﬁguration at u’s assignment time. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that F ′u \ {w} 
= ∅, since the upper bound is trivial otherwise. Let w′ ∈ F ′u be the second nearest
facility to u, i.e., d(u,w′) = d(F ′u \ {w}, u). Since u is initially assigned to w instead of w′, d(u,w)d(u,w′). Hence,
d(w,w′)2 d(u,w′). The ﬁnal assignment cost of u is dud(u,w) + xx−3m(w)d(u,w′) + xx−3m(w).
By hypothesis, both w and w′ are open at u’s assignment time. If w opens before w′, m(w) < d(w,w′)2 d(u,w′),
since w would have been merged with w′ otherwise. Therefore, for every x9,
du < d(u,w
′) + 2x
x − 3 d(u,w
′)4 d(u,w′).
If w opens after w′, for every x9,
x
x − 3 m(w)
x
x − 3
3
x
d(w′, w) 6
x − 3 d(u,w
′)d(u,w′)
because d(Fw,w)d(w′, w), since w′ opens before w and is still open at u’s assignment time. Hence, dud(u,w′)+
x
x−3m(w)2 d(u,w′). 
Proposition 21. Let K be a coalition with representative cK , and let u be a demand mapped to K. Then, for every
x9,
du4 (d(cK, u) + g′u(cK))4 (d(cK, u) + gu(cK)).
Proof. Recall that gu(cK) denotes the conﬁguration distance of cK at u’s arrival time and g′u(cK) denotes the conﬁg-
uration distance of cK at u’s assignment time (i.e., according to the updated algorithm’s conﬁguration). The second
inequality follows from g′u(cK)gu(cK), because the conﬁguration distance of cK is nonincreasing with time.
For the ﬁrst inequality, let w be the facility minimizing the conﬁguration distance of cK at u’s assignment time
(i.e., g′u(cK) = g′u(cK,w)). If u is initially assigned to w, using Proposition 19, we obtain that dud(cK, u) +
g′u(cK,w) = d(cK, u) + g′u(cK). If u is initially assigned to another facility w′, Proposition 20 implies that du
4 d(u,w). Furthermore,
d(u,w)d(cK, u) + d(cK,w)d(cK, u) + g′u(cK,w) = d(cK, u) + g′u(cK). 
4.4. Isolated coalitions
In this section, we ﬁrst establish the basic properties of isolated coalitions. These properties imply that the assignment
cost of good inner demands can be bounded similarly to the special case when there is a single optimal center. Then,
we prove Lemma 31, which gives an upper bound on the actual and the ﬁnal assignment cost of good inner demands.
Throughout this section, K denotes an isolated active coalition with representative cK . As before, we sometimes say
that a facility w is mapped to an optimal center in K instead of simply saying that w is mapped to K, because we want
to also consider facilities which open either before K becomes an isolated active coalition or after K has broken.
4.4.1. Basic properties
The aim of this paragraph is to establish that as far as an isolated active coalition K is concerned, the algorithm
behaves as if there were no optimal centers outside K. We start with the properties of the nearest facility to cK .
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Proposition 22. Let K be an isolated coalition, let cK be the representative of K, and let w be a facility that is the
nearest facility to cK at some point in time. Then,
(A) d(cK,w) < 13 sep(K) and w is mapped to an optimal center in K,
(B) after K becomes isolated and w becomes the nearest facility to cK , g(cK,w) < 13 sep(K),(C) w can be merged only with a new facility mapped to a center in K.
Proof. We observe that it sufﬁces to establish that each of the above claims holds as long as K is an isolated active
coalition and w is the nearest facility to cK . Then, (A) holds because the mapping of a facility to an optimal center
does not depend on the algorithm’s conﬁguration, (B) holds because g(cK,w) is nonincreasing, and (C) holds because
m(w) is nonincreasing.
(A) Let us consider any point in time when K is an isolated coalition and w is the nearest facility to cK . Then,
d(cK,w) = d(F, cK)g(cK) < 13 sep(K). The second claim follows from Proposition 16.(B) To reach a contradiction, let us assume that there is a point in time when K is an isolated active coalition,
w is the nearest facility to cK , and g(cK,w) 13 sep(K). Since K is an isolated active coalition, there exists
some other facility w′ which is open and satisﬁes the following inequalities at that particular point in time.
d(cK,w)d(cK,w′)g(cK,w′) < 13 sep(K)g(cK,w).
By Proposition 16, both w and w′ are mapped to optimal centers in K. To establish the contradiction, we consider
themoment when the last ofw,w′ opens. Ifw′ opens afterw, either d(cK,w)D(K), in which case d(cK,w′) <
2
5d(cK,w) (w′ is closer to cK than w) by Proposition 12A, or d(cK,w) < D(K), in which case g(cK) < D(K)(w′ has broken K) by Proposition 12B. If w opens after w′, then g(cK,w) < max{d(cK,w′), D(K)} by Propo-
sition 12B. Therefore, depending on whether d(cK,w′)D(K), either g(cK,w) < d(cK,w′) < 13 sep(K) or w
has broken K.
(C) There is a point in time when w is open and K is an isolated active coalition. After that time, w can be merged
only with a new facility at distance less than 13 sep(K) from cK . By Proposition 16, such a facility is mapped to
an optimal center in K. 
The following proposition states that if a demand u is mapped to an isolated active coalition K and is currently
assigned to the nearest facility to cK , its ﬁnal assignment cost is an upper bound on its actual assignment cost at any
point in time.
Proposition 23. Let u be a demand which is mapped to an isolated active coalition K and is currently assigned to a
facility w. If w is currently the nearest facility to cK , then u’s actual assignment cost will never exceed
min
{
d(u,w) + x
x − 3 m(w),
(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u
}
.
Proof. We restrict our attention to the case when(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u < d(u,w) +
x
x − 3 m(w)
because the actual assignment cost of u will never exceed d(u,w) + x
x−3m(w) (Proposition 4).
As long as w remains open, u’s actual assignment cost is d(u,w) and the upper bound holds because d(cK, cu)
D(K), since cu ∈ K . If w is merged with a new facility w′, by Proposition 22C, w′ is mapped to an optimal center in
K. Hence, by Proposition 12B, g(cK,w′) < max{d(cK,w), D(K)}. Then, the upper bound holds because u is now
assigned to w′ and by Proposition 4, u’s actual assignment cost will never exceed
d(u,w′) + x
x − 3m(w
′)  d(cu, u) + d(cK, cu) + d(cK,w′) + x
x − 3m(w
′)d∗u + D(K) + g(cK,w′)

(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u. 
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The following proposition states that as long as K is an isolated active coalition, the location wK of the nearest
facility to cK converges rapidly to cK .
Proposition 24. Let w′ be a new facility mapped to an isolated active coalition K. Then either w′ breaks K or
d(cK,wK)D(K), d(cK,w′) < 25d(cK,wK), and the location of wK changes to w′K = w′.
Proof. If d(cK,wK) < D(K), Proposition 12B implies that g(cK,w′) < D(K) and w′ breaks K. Hence, if K
remains active, d(cK,wK)D(K). Then, by Proposition 12A, d(cK,w′) < 25d(cK,wK). Therefore, w′ is much
closer to cK than wK and the location of wK changes to w′K = w′. 
We use the following proposition to show that each supported facility can be charged with the ﬁnal assignment cost
of some good demands which become bad at most once.
Proposition 25. Let K be an isolated active coalition, let wK = w be the nearest facility to cK , and let w′ be a new
facility mapped to K. If w′ does not break K, then w will never become again the nearest facility to any of the optimal
centers in K.
Proof. If w′ does not break K, Proposition 24 implies that d(cK,w)D(K). Moreover, d(cK,w′) < 25d(cK,w) and
the location of the nearest facility to cK changes from wK = w to w′K = w′. For every optimal center c ∈ K ,
g(c,w′) = d(c,w′) + x
x − 3m(w
′)
 d(cK,w′) + D(K) + x
x − 3
3
x
(d(cK,w
′) + d(cK,w)) <
(
2
5
+ 1

+ 7
5
3
x − 3
)
d(cK,w)

(
2
5
+ 1

+ 7
5
3
x − 3
)(
1 + 1

)
d(c,w) < d(c,w).
The second inequality follows from c ∈ K and m(w′) 3
x
d(w,w′), and the third inequality follows from Proposition
12A. The last inequality holds for every x11 (recall that  = 3x + 2). Hence, after w′ opens, there will always exist
a facility closer to c than w. 
Next we show that the part of the algorithm’s conﬁguration having to do with an isolated active coalition K is not
affected by new demands not mapped to K.
Lemma 26. Let K be an isolated active coalition when a new demand u arrives. If u is not mapped to K, then neither
the location of wK nor the value of g(cK) can change.
Proof. If a new facility w opens when u arrives, w is located at the same point as u and is also not mapped to K. Then,
the value of g(cK) cannot decrease because g(cK) < 13 sep(K), while g
′(cK,w)d(cK,w) = d(cK, u) 12 sep(K)(Proposition 16). In addition, the location of wK cannot change, because w is not closer to cK than wK and the facility
at the current location of wK can only be merged with a new facility mapped to K (Proposition 22).
If no new facilities open when u arrives, the location ofwK cannot change. Next, we show that g(cK) cannot decrease
because of u. Let w be the facility to which u is initially assigned. Then, only the conﬁguration distance between cK
and w can be affected by u. To reach a contradiction, we assume that after u’s initial assignment to w, it becomes
g′(cK,w) = d(cK,w) + x
x − 3 m
′(w) < g(cK) <
1
3
sep(K).
Therefore, d(cK,w) < 13 sep(K) and m
′(w) < x−33x sep(K). In addition, since d(cK, u)
1
2 sep(K), d(u,w) > 0.
The conﬁguration distance g(cK,w) decreases only if the initial assignment of u to w violates (1). Then, the
algorithm decreases m(w) and restores the invariant. Eq. (1) can be violated only if d(u,w) m(w) and u is included in
Ball(w, m(w) ). The new merge radius m
′(w) cannot be less than (x−3)
x
d(u,w), because if m′(w) = (x−3)
x
d(u,w),
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then m
′(w)
 < d(u,w). Hence, u is no longer included in Ball(w,
m′(w)
 ), and the invariant is restored. Therefore,
(x−3)
x
d(u,w)m′(w) < x−33x sep(K), which implies that d(u,w) <
1
3 sep(K).
Consequently, if g′(cK,w) could drop below 13 sep(K) because of u’s initial assignment tow, it would be d(cK,w) <
1
3 sep(K) and d(u,w) <
1
3 sep(K). Therefore, for every 3, it would be d(cK, u) <
1
2 sep(K), which is a
contradiction. 
As long as K is an isolated active coalition, the location of wK cannot change unless a new facility mapped to K
opens (Lemma 26). Hence, each time the location of the nearest facility to cK changes, either the new facility breaks K
or the new location w′K is at least 2.5 times closer to cK than the previous location wK (Proposition 24). On the other
hand, a facility not mapped to an optimal center in K is at least 53 times further from cK than wK (Proposition 15).
Moreover, the inner demands of K are included in a small ball around cK . Therefore, each new inner demand of K
is initially assigned to the nearest facility to cK and becomes a good demand. The following lemma formalizes the
aforementioned intuition.
Lemma 27. Let K be an isolated active coalition, and let wK denote the nearest facility to cK .
(A) wK is at least 53 times closer to cK than any other facility, i.e., d(cK,wK) < 35d(F \ {wK}, cK).(B) If d(cK,wK) < D(K), then d(F \ {wK}, cK) > D(K).
(C) Every inner demand of the isolated active coalition K which does not break K is initially assigned to w′K , i.e., the
nearest facility to cK at the demand’s assignment time.
Proof. (A) Similar to the proof of Proposition 22B, let us assume that there is a point in time when K is an
isolated active coalition, w = wK is the nearest facility to cK , and there is a facility w′ ∈ F \ {w} such that
d(cK,w
′)d(cK,w) 35d(cK,w′). To establish the contradiction, we consider the moment when the last of w, w′
opens.
If w′ opens after w and w′ is mapped to an optimal center in K, then either d(cK,w)D(K), in which case
d(cK,w
′) < 25d(cK,w) (w′ is closer to cK than w) by Proposition 12A, or d(cK,w) < D(K), and g(cK,w′) <
D(K) (w′ has broken K) by Proposition 12B. If w′ opens after w and w′ is mapped to an optimal center not in K, then
d(cK,w) <
3
5d(cK,w
′) by Proposition 15, since d(cK,w) < 13 sep(K) by Proposition 22A.
On the other hand, by Proposition 22A, the facility w is mapped to an optimal center in K. Hence, if w opens after w′,
then either d(cK,w′)D(K), in which case d(cK,w) < 25d(cK,w′) by Proposition 12A, or d(cK,w′) < D(K),
and g(cK,w) < D(K) (w has broken K) by Proposition 12B.
(B) The proof is similar to the proof of (A). To reach a contradiction, we assume that there is a point in time when
K is an isolated active coalition, w = wK is the nearest facility in K, d(cK,w) < D(K), and there is a facility
w′ ∈ F \ {w} such that D(K)d(cK,w′)d(cK,w). Since K spends some time as an isolated active coalition,
1
3 sep(K) > D(K). Hence, both w and w
′ are mapped to optimal centers in K (Proposition 16). By Proposition 12B,
K breaks at the moment when the last of w and w′ opens.
(C) Let u be an inner demand of K which does not break K. Let w′K be the nearest facility to cK and F ′ be the
algorithm’s facility conﬁguration at u’s assignment time. We recall that a demand u mapped to an isolated active
coalition K is inner if d∗u < 1 max{d(cK,w′K), D(K)}.
If d(cK,w′K)D(K), then d(u,w′K)d∗u + D(K) + d(cK,w′K) < (1 + 2 )d(cK,w′K), while for every facility
w ∈ F ′ \ {w′K}, d(u,w)d(cK,w) − D(K) − d∗u > ( 53 − 2 )d(cK,w′K) > d(u,w′K). The second inequality follows
from (A), and the third inequality holds for every x2 and  = 3x + 2.
If d(cK,w′K) < D(K), then d(u,w′K)d∗u + D(K) + d(cK,w′K) < ( + 2)D(K), while for every facility
w ∈ F ′ \ {w′K}, d(u,w)d(cK,w) − D(K) − d∗u > ((+ 2)(+ 2) − 2)D(K) > d(u,w′K). The second inequality
follows from (B) (recall that  = (+ 2)(+ 2)).
In both cases, d(u,w′K) < d(u, F ′ \ {w′K}) and u is initially assigned to w′K , i.e., the nearest facility to cK at u’s
assignment time. 
The following lemma states that the ﬁnal assignment cost of outer demands can be charged to their optimal assignment
cost.
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Lemma 28. Let u be an outer demand of the isolated active coalition K which does not break K. Then, du4(+2)d∗u .
Proof. It is d∗u 1 max{d(cK,w′K), D(K)} because u is an outer demand mapped to an isolated active coalition.
If u is initially assigned to w′K (i.e., the nearest facility to cK at u’s assignment time), u’s ﬁnal assignment cost is
du(1+ 1 )max{d(cK,w′K), D(K)} + d∗u(+ 2) d∗u . Otherwise, let wˆ 
= w′K be the facility u is initially assigned
to. By Proposition 20, du4 d(F ′u \ {wˆ}, u)4 d(u,w′K)4(+ 2) d∗u , where the second inequality follows from the
fact that w′K ∈ F ′u \ {wˆ}, because wˆ 
= w′K . 
4.4.2. Good inner demands
In this paragraph, we restrict our attention to the assignment cost of inner demands of K. We have shown that each
new inner demand of K is initially assigned to the nearest facility to cK and becomes a good demand. Next, we show
that the assignment cost of the good inner demands initially assigned to the same facility cannot exceed f . More
speciﬁcally, let w be the facility which is currently the nearest facility to cK , and let GK(w) denote the set of good
inner demands of K (i.e., the subset of GK ) whose initial assignment takes place while w is the nearest facility to cK .
As long as K is an isolated active coalition and w is the nearest facility to cK , each new inner demand of K is initially
assigned to w (Lemma 27C) and is added to both GK and GK(w). After either K has broken or the location of the
nearest facility to cK has changed, w cannot become the nearest facility to the representative of K again (Proposition
25) and no additional demands are added to GK(w).
The following complementary pair of lemmas establish that the assignment cost of the demands in GK(w)
is O(f ).
Lemma 29. Let K be an isolated active coalition, and let w be the nearest facility to cK (i.e., wK = w). If d(cK,w)
D(K), then
∑
u∈GK(w)
d(u,w) < f and
∑
u∈GK(w)
du <
+ 2
− 2 f.
Proof. We consider the above sums just after a new demand is added to GK(w). Let v be the demand in GK(w) arriving
last. Since v is added to GK(w), K is an isolated active coalition and w is the nearest facility to cK at v’s assignment
time. Therefore, from the moment the ﬁrst demand is added to GK(w) until the assignment time of v, no new facilities
mapped to K have opened. Otherwise, by Propositions 24 and 25, either K would have broken or the location of the
nearest facility to cK would have changed and w could not become the nearest facility to cK again.
Since (i) all the demands in GK(w) are inner demands mapped to the isolated active coalition K, (ii) their initial
assignment takes place while w is the nearest facility to cK , and (iii) d(cK,w)D(K), by the deﬁnition of inner
demands mapped to an isolated active coalition, we obtain that for every u ∈ GK(w), d∗u < 1d(cK,w).
The proof consists of establishing the following claims: (i) just after v has been added to GK(w), GK(w) ⊆ Bv =
Ball(v, rv) ∩ L, where rv = d(Fv, v)/x (see also Fig. 1), and (ii) for all u ∈ GK(w), d(Fv, u) = d(w, u). Since v
is initially assigned to w instead of opening a new facility, Pot(Bv) = ∑u∈Bv d(Fv, u) < f and the ﬁrst inequality
follows. The second inequality is a consequence of the ﬁrst one and the deﬁnition of the ﬁnal assignment cost.
We ﬁrst prove that just after v has been added to GK(w), GK(w) ⊆ Bv = Ball(v, rv) ∩ L. Let uw be the demand
which is located at the same point as w and causes the algorithm to open the facility w. The demand uw is initially
assigned to w, but it does not belong to L. We show that uw /∈ GK(w) and the demands in GK(w) (including v) arrive
after w has opened. If uw is not mapped to the isolated active coalition K, it does not belong to GK(w) by deﬁnition.
Otherwise, uw cannot be an inner demand of K, because w is the nearest facility to cK at uw’s assignment time and
d∗uwd(cK,w) − D(K)(1 − 1 )d(cK,w) 1 max{d(cK,w), D(K)}.
Each new demand is added to the set of unsatisﬁed demands L when it arrives. Next, we show that none of the
demands in GK(w) can be removed from L before either K breaks or a new facility mapped to K opens. More
speciﬁcally, for each new facility w′ which opens after w and includes in its neighborhood Bw′ some demands from
GK(w), d(cK,w′) < 3x d(cK,w) <
1
x
sep(K), where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 14 and the second
from Proposition 22A. Hence, w′ is mapped to an optimal center in K (Proposition 16). Since no new facilities mapped
to K open until v’s assignment time, GK(w) ⊆ L.
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We also prove that GK(w) ⊆ Ball(v, rv) by demonstrating that rv is greater than the diameter of GK(w). We ﬁrst
bound rv from below.
rv = d(Fv, v)
x
= d(v,w)
x
 d(cK,w) − d(cK, cv) − d
∗
v
x
>
(
1 − 2

)
d(cK,w)
x
= 3

d(cK,w).
The second equality holds because no new facility opens when v arrives and v is initially assigned to w (i.e., d(Fv, v) =
d(F ′v, v) = d(v,w)). The fourth inequality holds because d∗v < 1d(cK,w) and d(cK, cv)D(K) 1d(cK,w), since
cv ∈ K . The last equality follows from the choice of  = 3x + 2.
On the other hand, since for every u ∈ GK(w), d∗u < 1d(cK,w), GK(w) has a small diameter. In particular, for
every u ∈ GK(w), d(u, v)d(u, cu)+d(cu, cv)+d(cv, v) < 3d(cK,w) < rv . Since v belongs to GK(w), Ball(v, rv)
includes every demand in GK(w), and GK(w) ⊆ Bv .
Then, we show that for every u ∈ GK(w) (including v), d(Fv, u) = d(w, u). In other words, the potential of the
demands in GK(w) at v’s arrival time is equal to their initial assignment cost. Since w is open at v’s assignment
time, d(Fv, u)d(w, u). On the other hand, at the moment v arrives, K is an isolated active coalition and w is the
nearest facility to cK . By Lemma 27A, d(cK,w) < 35d(Fv \ {w}, cK). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 27C, case
d(cK,w)D(K), we prove that d(Fv \ {w}, u)d(Fv \ {w}, cK) − D(K) − d∗u > ( 53 − 2 )d(cK,w) > d(u,w).
Therefore, for every u ∈ GK(w) (including v), d(Fv, u) = d(u,w).
The total potential in v’s neighborhood Bv is less than f , because v is initially assigned to w instead of opening a
new facility and being initially assigned there. Consequently,
f > Pot(Bv) = ∑
u∈Bv
d(Fv, u)
∑
u∈GK(w)
d(Fv, u) = ∑
u∈GK(w)
d(u,w).
The third inequality follows from GK(w) ⊆ Bv , and the fourth inequality from the fact that the potential of each
u ∈ GK(w) is equal to d(u,w). This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst inequality.
As for the ﬁnal assignment cost, for every u ∈ GK(w), we bound du using Proposition 23:
du
(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u <
+ 2

d(cK,w).
Then, the second inequality follows from the ﬁrst one by observing that for every u ∈ GK(w), d(u,w) >

−2d(cK,w). 
Lemma 30. Let K be an isolated active coalition, and let w be the nearest facility to cK . If d(cK,w) < D(K), for
every x18 and 103 5,∑
u∈GK(w)
d(u,w) <


f and
∑
u∈GK(w)
du <
3
2
f.
Proof. By the claims (i) and (ii) at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 29 and the hypothesis that d(cK,w) < D(K),
for every u ∈ GK(w), d∗u < D(K) and d(cK, u) < 2D(K).
As before, we consider the above sums just after a new demand is added to GK(w). Let v be the demand in
GK(w) arriving last. Since v is added to GK(w), K is an isolated active coalition at v’s assignment time. Therefore,
m(w)( + 2)D(K), because K would have broken otherwise (Proposition 17, for  = D(K), x18, and 5).
Using (1), we obtain that:
|Init(w) ∩ Ball(w, (+ 2)D(K))| · (+ 2)D(K)f. (8)
We show that as long as w is the nearest facility to cK and K remains an isolated active coalition, GK(w) ⊆ Init(w) ∩
Ball(w, (+2)D(K)). Since all the demands in GK(w) are initially assigned tow (Lemma 27C), GK(w) ⊆ Init(w). In
addition, for every u ∈ GK(w), d(u,w)d∗u +D(K)+ d(w, cK) < (+ 2)D(K). Hence, GK(w) ⊆ Ball(w, (+ 2)
D(K)). Combining GK(w) ⊆ Init(w) ∩ Ball(w, (+ 2)D(K)) with (8), we conclude that
∑
u∈GK(w)
d(u,w) < |GK(w)| · (+ 2)D(K) 

f.
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As for the ﬁnal assignment cost, we have shown that as long as w is the nearest facility to cK and K remains an isolated
active coalition, GK(w) ⊆ Init(w) ∩ Ball(w, m(w) ). Hence, by (1), |GK(w)| · m(w)f . Applying the deﬁnition of
the ﬁnal assignment cost, we obtain that
∑
u∈GK(w)
du
∑
u∈GK(w)
d(u,w) + x
x − 3
∑
u∈GK(w)
m(w)
(
1

+ x
x − 3
)
f  3
2
f,
where the last inequality holds for every  103 and x18. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Lemma 31. Let K be an isolated active coalition. The total actual assignment cost of the good demands of K is∑
u∈GK
d(u,wK) < 2f + 3 ∑
u∈GK
d∗u (9)
and the total ﬁnal assignment cost (according to the current algorithm’s conﬁguration) of the good demands of K is∑
u∈GK
du < 4.5f + 7 ∑
u∈GK
d∗u. (10)
Proof. We ﬁrst prove (9) and then derive (10) from (9). The proof of (9) is by induction over a sequence of merge
operations where the former nearest facility to cK is merged with the new nearest facility to cK .
Eq. (9) is trivially true when GK = ∅. By deﬁnition, the set of good demands GK is empty as long as K is either
non-isolated or not active. In addition, GK becomes empty every time the location of the nearest facility to cK changes
without the facility at the previous location wK being merged with the facility at the new location w′K . We inductively
assume that the inequality holds just before the current location of the nearest facility to cK changes. We show that the
inequality remains valid until either the location of the nearest facility to cK changes again or K breaks.
Let w be the nearest facility to cK , i.e., wK = w. By Lemma 26, the location of wK cannot change unless a new
facility mapped to K opens. Let w′ be the next facility mapped to K. Let GK be the set of good demands just before
w′ opens. We inductively assume that (9) holds just before w′ opens. Without loss of generality, we assume that w′
does not break K because GK becomes empty otherwise. Therefore, by Proposition 24, (i) d(cK,w)D(K), (ii)
d(cK,w
′) < 25d(cK,w), and (iii) the location of the nearest facility to cK changes from wK = w to w′K = w′.
If w is not merged with w′, the set of good demands becomes empty and
∑
u∈GK d(u,w
′) = 0 just after w′ opens.
If w is merged with w′, we show that just after w has been merged with w′,∑u∈GK d(u,w′) < f + 3∑u∈GK d∗u . For
every u ∈ GK , we bound d(u,w′) from above in terms of d(u,w) and d∗u .
d(u,w′)  d∗u + D(K) + d(cK,w′) u is mapped to cu ∈ K
 d∗u + D(K) +
2
5
d(cK,w) Proposition 12A
 d∗u +
(
1

+ 2
5
)
d(cK,w) d(cK,w)D(K)
 d∗u +
(
1

+ 2
5
)

− 1 [d
∗
u + d(u,w)] d(cK,w)

− 1 [d
∗
u + d(u,w)]
 1
2
d(u,w) + 3
2
d∗u for every x5 and  = 3x + 2.
Before the initial assignment of the demand which cause w′ to open, the set of good demands of K is GK , i.e., exactly
the same as the set of good demands of K just before w′ opens. Using the previous bound on d(u,w′) and the inductive
hypothesis, we conclude that just after w is merged with w′,
∑
u∈GK
d(u,w′)  1
2
∑
u∈GK
d(u,w) + 3
2
∑
u∈GK
d∗u <
1
2
[
2f + 3 ∑
u∈GK
d∗u
]
+ 3
2
∑
u∈GK
d∗u = f + 3
∑
u∈GK
d∗u.
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Let G′K be the set of good demands of K just before either K breaks or a new facility mapped to K opens and the
location of the nearest facility to cK changes again. By deﬁnition, every inner demand added to G′K after w′ opens is
also added to GK(w′). Namely, G′K = GK ∪GK(w′). By Lemmas 29 and 30, we know that
∑
u∈GK(w′) d(u,w
′) < f .
Hence, as long as w′ is the nearest facility to cK and K remains an isolated active coalition,∑
u∈G′K
d(u,w′) = ∑
u∈GK
d(u,w′) + ∑
u∈GK(w′)
d(u,w′) < 2f + 3 ∑
u∈GK
d∗u.
This concludes the proof of (9). We proceed to establish (10).
As before, let w′ be the nearest facility to cK (i.e., wK = w′), and let G′K be the current set of good inner demands of
K. We ﬁrst consider the case when d(cK,w′)D(K). Since every demand u ∈ G′K is mapped to the isolated active
coalition K and is currently assigned to the nearest facility to cK , we can bound the ﬁnal assignment cost of u using the
upper bound of Proposition 23:
du 
(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w′), D(K)} + d∗u
 + 1

d(cK,w
′) + d∗u assumption d(cK,w′)D(K)
 + 1


− 1 [d
∗
u + d(u,w′)] + d∗u d(cK,w′)

− 1 [d
∗
u + d(u,w′)]
 3
2
d(u,w′) + 5
2
d∗u for every x1 and  = 3x + 2.
Using (9), we conclude that
∑
u∈G′K
du < 3f + 7 ∑
u∈G′K
d∗u. (11)
We have also to consider the case when d(cK,w′) < D(K). As before, let G′K denote the current set of good demands
of K, and let GK be the set of good demands of K just after w′ opens. We recall that G′K = GK ∪ GK(w′). By Lemma
30,
∑
u∈GK(w′) du
3
2f .
We also bound the ﬁnal assignment cost of the demands in GK according to the current algorithm’s conﬁguration.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of good demands of K is nonempty just after w′ opens (GK 
= ∅),
since there is nothing to bound otherwise. Let w be the nearest facility to cK just before w′ opens. By Proposition
22A, both w and w′ are mapped to optimal centers in K. Hence, d(cK,w)D(K), since w′ would break K otherwise
(Proposition 12B). Since we assume that GK 
= ∅, the facility w is merged with w′ just after w′ opens. In addition, the
demands in GK , currently assigned to w′, are assigned to w before w′ opens. Consequently, we can use (9) and obtain∑
u∈GK d(u,w) < 2f + 3
∑
u∈GK d
∗
u .
By the upper bound of Proposition 23, the ﬁnal assignment cost of every demand u ∈ GK according to the current
algorithm’s conﬁguration is du < (+ 1)D(K) + d∗u , because u is currently assigned to w′ and d(cK,w′) < D(K).
Since d(cK,w)D(K), similarly to the proof of (11), we obtain that for every u ∈ GK ,
du < (+ 1)D(K) + d∗u
(
1 + 1

)
max{d(cK,w), D(K)} + d∗u
3
2
d(u,w) + 5
2
d∗u.
Therefore, (11) also holds for the ﬁnal assignment cost of the demands in GK according to the current algorithm’s
conﬁguration. We conclude the proof of the lemma by applying Lemma 30 to the demands in GK(w′) and (11) to the
demands in GK :∑
u∈G′K
du = ∑
u∈GK
du + ∑
u∈GK(w′)
du < 3f + 7 ∑
u∈GK
d∗u + 1.5f 4.5f + 7
∑
u∈G′K
d∗u. 
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4.5. Non-isolated coalitions
We start by bounding the ﬁnal assignment cost of inner and outer demands mapped to non-isolated active
coalitions.
Lemma 32. Let u be an outer demand mapped to a non-isolated active coalition K. Then, du4[(+ 1)2 + 2] d∗u .
Proof. Applying Proposition 21, we obtain that
du4 [d(cK, u) + gu(cK)] < 4 [d∗u + D(K) + (+ 1)2DN(K)]4((+ 1)2 + 2) d∗u.
The second inequality follows from gu(cK) < ( + 1)2DN(K), since K is a non-isolated active coalition when u
arrives (see also Lemma 10), and the third inequality from d∗uDN(K)D(K), because u is an outer demand mapped
to the non-isolated active coalition K. 
Lemma 33. Let u be an inner demand mapped to a non-isolated active coalition K. If u does not make K either isolated
or broken, then du5 g′u(cK).
Proof. We recall that g′u(cK) denotes the conﬁguration distance of cK at u’s assignment time (i.e., according to the
updated algorithm’s conﬁguration). Applying Proposition 21, we obtain that
du4 [d∗u + D(K) + g′u(cK)]4
(
2

+ 1
)
g′u(cK) < 5 g′u(cK).
The second inequality follows from (i) d∗u < DN(K) because u ∈ inN(K), (ii)D(K)DN(K), and (iii) DN(K)g′u
(cK), since K remains a non-isolated active coalition at u’s assignment time. The last inequality holds because  =
(+ 2)(+ 2) > 8. 
The ﬁnal assignment cost of the outer demands mapped to a non-isolated active coalition is charged to their optimal
assignment cost. We charge the ﬁnal assignment cost of the inner demands which are mapped to a non-isolated active
coalition K and remain unsatisﬁed at their assignment time to the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands NK . The main result
of this section establishes that the ﬁnal assignment cost charged to NK is O(2f ).
Lemma 34. For every non-isolated active coalition K,
|NK | · g(cK)(+ 4)2f.
Proof. We recall the deﬁnitions of DN(K) = max{D(K), 13 sep(K)} and the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands NK =
inN(K) ∩ L. Since g(cK) is nonincreasing with time, the product |NK | · g(cK) can increase only if a new demand is
added to NK . Therefore, it sufﬁces to establish the inequality just after a new demand is added to NK .
A new demand v is added to NK if: (i) v is an inner demand mapped to the non-isolated active coalition K (i.e.,
v ∈ inN(K)), (ii) no new facilities openwhen v arrives and v is not removed from the set of unsatisﬁed demands, and (iii)
v does not make the coalition K either isolated or broken (i.e., g′(cK)DN(K)). We recall that a demand v mapped to
a non-isolated active coalition is inner if d∗v < DN(K). Since NK ⊆ inN(K), for every u ∈ NK , d(cK, u) < 2DN(K)
and the diameter of the sets NK and inN(K) is less than 3DN(K).
Let v be the last demand added to NK , and let NK /N′K be the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands of K before/after v
(i.e., N′K = NK ∪ {v}). As usual, we use unprimed symbols to refer to the algorithm’s conﬁguration at v’s arrival time
and primed symbols to refer to the updated algorithm’s conﬁguration at v’s assignment time.
We ﬁrst consider the case when d(Fv, cK)DN(K) at v’s arrival time. Therefore, d(Fv, v) > ( − 2)DN(K)
and rv = d(Fv,v)x > 3DN(K) (recall that  = 3x + 2). Hence, Ball(v, rv) includes every demand in DN(K) and
Bv = Ball(v, rv) ∩ L includes every demand in N′K . Since no new facilities open when v arrives,
f > Pot(Bv) = ∑
u∈Bv
d(Fv, u)
∑
u∈N′K
d(Fv, u) > |N ′K |(− 2)DN(K).
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The last inequality holds because for every u ∈ N′K , d(Fv, u) > (− 2)DN(K). Since K is an active coalition when v
arrives, g′(cK)g(cK) < (+ 1)2DN(K) (Lemma 10). Therefore,
|N′K | · g′(cK) <
((+ 2)(+ 2) + 1)2
− 2 f (+ 4)
2f,
where the last inequality holds for  = 3x + 2,  = (+ 2)(+ 2), and  3x−42 .
We have also to consider the case when d(Fv, cK) < DN(K). Let w be the nearest facility to cK at v’s arrival time.
By hypothesis, d(w, cK) < DN(K). We will show that
N′K ⊆ Init′(w) ∩ Ball
(
w,
m′(w)

)
. (12)
Before establishing (12), we prove that it indeed implies the lemma. We ﬁrst observe that m′(w)( + 2)DN(K)
(Proposition 17 for  = DN(K), x18, and5), because K remains a non-isolated active coalition at v’s assignment
time. Therefore, d(cK,w) < DN(K) < 1m
′(w). By (12) and (1), |N′K | · m′(w)f . Therefore,
|N′K | · g′(cK)  |N′K | · g′(cK,w) |N′K |
(
d(cK,w) + x
x − 3 m
′(w)
)
< |N′K |
(
1

+ x
x − 3
)
m′(w) 3
2
f < (+ 4)2f.
We proceed to prove (12). For each demand u ∈ inN(K), d(u,w) < ( + 2)DN(K) because d(cK,w) < DN(K).
Since m′(w)(+ 2)DN(K), every demand in N′K is also included in Ball(w, m
′(w)
 ).
Next, we show that all the demands in N′K are initially assigned to w. We ﬁrst observe that when w opens,
d(Fw,w)x(+ 2)DN(K). Otherwise, it would be
m(w) 3
x
d(Fw,w) < 3(+ 2)DN(K)(+ 2)DN(K)
and w would have made K either isolated or broken.
Since d(Fw,w)x( + 2)DN(K), Ball(w, d(Fw,w)x ) includes every demand in inN(K) (recall that for every u ∈
inN(K), d(u,w) < (+ 2)DN(K)). Thus, w’s neighborhood Bw = Ball(w, d(Fw,w)x ) ∩ L includes every unsatisﬁed
inner demand of K. Therefore, the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands of K becomes empty and the demands currently in
N′K arrive after w opens.
In addition, for every facilityw′ opening afterw opens and before v’s initial assignment, d(cK,w′)2(+2)DN(K).
Otherwise, w′ would make K either isolated or broken because
g(cK,w
′) = d(cK,w′) + x
x − 3m(w
′) < 2(+ 2)DN(K) + x
x − 3
3
x
d(w,w′)
 2(+ 2)DN(K) + 3
x − 3 [d(cK,w
′) + d(cK,w)] <
(
2 + 9
x − 3
)
(+ 2)DN(K)
= 2x + 3
x − 3 (+ 2)DN(K)(+ 2)(+ 2)DN(K).
Hence, after w opens and before v’s initial assignment, d(F \ {w}, cK)2( + 2)DN(K). Therefore, for each inner
demand u which is mapped to K and arrives after w opens and before v’s initial assignment (including v),
d(u,w) < (+ 2)DN(K) < (2+ 2)DN(K)d(F \ {w}, u).
In other words, every inner demand of K arriving after w opens and before v’s assignment is initially assigned to w and
added to Init(w). Thus, N′K ⊆ Init′(w) because the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands of K becomes empty at the moment
when w opens and the inner demands of K arriving after w are initially assigned to w. Combining this inclusion with
N′K ⊆ Ball(w, m
′(w)
 ), we obtain (12). 
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The following proposition establishes that every time some inner demands of K become satisﬁed and are removed
from NK , the conﬁguration distance of cK decreases by a constant factor. Since K becomes either isolated or broken
after g(cK) has decreased by a factor of (1 + 1 )2 (Lemma 11), the ﬁnal assignment cost of the demands in inN(K)
is O(ln()2f ).
Proposition 35. Let K be a non-isolated active coalition and let w be a new facility for which the neighborhood Bw
intersects the set inN(K). Then, for every x18, g′(cK,w) < 13g(cK).
Proof. Let u be a demand which belongs to both Bw and inN(K). Therefore, d(u,w) d(Fw,w)x and d(cK, u) <
2DN(K). Using these inequalities, we obtain that
d(Fw,w)d(Fw, cK) + d(cK, u) + d(u,w) < d(Fw, cK) + 2DN(K) + d(Fw,w)
x
which implies that
d(Fw,w) <
x
x − 1d(Fw, cK) +
2x
x − 1DN(K). (13)
After w opens, the conﬁguration distance between cK and w becomes
g′(cK,w) = d(cK,w) + x
x − 3m(w)
 d(cK, u) + d(u,w) + x
x − 3
3
x
d(Fw,w)
< 2DN(K) +
(
1
x
+ 3
x − 3
)
d(Fw,w) d(u,w)
d(Fw,w)
x
 2DN(K) + 5
x
d(Fw,w) for every x12
<
(
2 + 10
x − 1
)
DN(K) + 5
x − 1d(Fw, cK) by (13)
 3DN(K) + 5
x − 1d(Fw, cK) for every x11

(
3

+ 5
x − 1
)
g(cK)
1
3
g(cK)
The penultimate inequality follows from g(cK)DN(K) and g(cK)d(Fw, cK). The ultimate inequality holds for
every x18,  = 3x + 2, and  = (+ 2)(+ 2). 
4.6. A potential function argument
In this section, we develop a potential function argument which combines the different parts of the analysis and
establishes that the assignment cost of IFL remains within a constant factor of the optimal cost.
4.6.1. The potential function
We use the following potential function to bound the algorithm’s assignment cost.
	 = ∑
K∈K
	K where 	K = 
(1)K + 
(2)K − Υ (N)K − Υ (I)K .
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We recall that K denotes the hierarchical decomposition of F ∗ implied by Lemma 10. The functions 
(1)K and 
(2)K are
deﬁned as

(1)K =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
[5(+ 4)2 + 9.5] f if g(cK)DN(K)(K is a non-isolated coalition),
7f if D(K)g(cK) < 13 sep(K)(K is an isolated coalition)
0 if g(cK) < D(K)(K has broken).

(2)K = [5(+ 4)2 + 2.5] f max
{
ln
(
min{g(cK), (+ 1)2DN(K)}
DN(K)
)
, 0
}
.
In addition, the functions Υ (N)K and Υ
(I)
K are deﬁned as:
Υ
(N)
K = 5 |NK | · g(cK) and Υ (I)K =
∑
u∈GK
(d(u,wK) − 7d∗u).
4.6.2. Outline
With the exception of good inner demands, each new demand is irrevocably charged with its ﬁnal assignment
cost at its assignment time. The ﬁnal assignment cost of outer demands is charged to their optimal assignment cost
(Lemmas 28 and 32). The ﬁnal assignment cost of unsatisﬁed inner demands mapped to a non-isolated active coalition
K is initially charged to the function Υ (N)K (cf. Lemma 33) and subsequently to K’s credit held by the functions 
(1)K
and 
(2)K .
Good inner demands are charged with their actual assignment cost as long as they remain good and with their ﬁnal
assignment cost at the moment they become bad. The actual assignment cost of a good demand mapped to an isolated
active coalition K is always equal to its distance from the nearest facility to cK . As long as the demand remains good,
this cost is charged to the function Υ (I)K . When some good demands become bad, their ﬁnal assignment cost is charged
to either K’s credit or the supported facility makes them bad. The potential function argument is outlined in Fig. 3.
4.6.3. Notation and preliminaries
Throughout this section, AsgK denotes the assignment cost the algorithm has been charged for the demands mapped
to the coalition K. As usual, unprimed symbols denote the value of the potential function and its components at the
arrival time of a new demand and primed symbols denote the value of the potential function at the assignment time of
the demand. In addition, for a coalition K, 	K = 	′K −	K denotes the change in the value of the potential function
	K and AsgK = Asg′K − AsgK denotes the difference in the assignment cost charged to K.
We recall that the set of good inner demands GK of a coalition K is deﬁned to be empty as long as K is either
non-isolated or not active. Similarly, the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands NK of a coalition K is deﬁned to be empty as
long as K is either isolated or not active.
In the following, we focus on the coalitions being active when a new demand arrives. The reason is that if a coalition
K is not active when a new demand arrives, 	K cannot increase and AsgK cannot change because of the new demand.
More speciﬁcally, the functions 
(1)K and 

(2)
K are nonincreasing with time, since g(cK) is nonincreasing with time.
Hence, the function 	K cannot increase if K is not active and both GK and NK are empty. Furthermore, a new demand
cannot affect the cost charged to the algorithm for the demands mapped to a non-active coalition K. In particular, if K
has not become active yet, there have been no demands mapped to K, while if K has become active and then broken,
the algorithm has been irrevocably charged with the ﬁnal assignment cost of the demands mapped to K.
First of all, we prove that the potential function 	 is nonnegative.
Lemma 36. For every coalition K ∈ K, 	K always remains nonnegative.
Proof. As long as K is a non-isolated coalition, 
(1)K = [5( + 4)2 + 9.5] f , while Υ (I)K = 0 (recall that GK = ∅)
and Υ (N)K 5(+ 4)2f (Lemma 34). As long as K is an isolated coalition, 
(1)K = 7f , while Υ (N)K = 0 (recall that
NK = ∅) and Υ (I)K < 3f (Lemma 31). Finally, after K has broken, 	K = 0. In any case, 	K0. 
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Fig. 3. A sketch of the potential function argument.
4.6.4. Isolated active coalitions
Let K be an isolated active coalition with representative cK . Then,
	K = 
(1)K + 7
∑
u∈GK
d∗u −
∑
u∈GK
d(u,wK)
because 
(2)K = Υ (N)K = 0. In addition, 
(1)K is equal to 7f as long as K is an active coalition (g(cK)D(K)), and it
becomes zero as soon as K breaks (g(cK) < D(K)). We ﬁrst prove that in the analysis of the isolated active coalition
K, we can ignore the demands not mapped to K.
Lemma 37. Let K be an isolated active coalition when a new demand u arrives. If u is not mapped to K, then
AsgK = 0 and 	K = 0.
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Proof. The assignment cost of u is charged to the unique active coalition u is mapped to. By hypothesis, this coalition
is different from K. In addition, the ﬁnal assignment cost charged to the algorithm for the outer and the bad demands of
K is irrevocable and cannot be affected by u. It remains to establish that the assignment cost charged to the algorithm
for the good demands of K is not affected by u. By Lemma 26, the arrival of u can change neither the value of g(cK)
nor the location of the nearest facility to cK . Hence, both the set of good demands GK and their actual assignment cost
do not change because of u. Therefore, both AsgK = 0 and Υ (I)K = 0. Furthermore, since the value of g(cK) does
not change, the function 
(1)K remains equal to 7f and 	K = 0. 
If u is a new demand mapped to the isolated active coalition K, u’s assignment cost is added to AsgK . Furthermore,
u can change the assignment cost charged to the algorithm for the demands of K which are good (namely, they are
included in GK ) at the moment u arrives. First of all, u can break K. As a result, the good demands of K become bad
and the algorithm is charged with their ﬁnal assignment cost instead of their actual assignment cost. If u opens a new
facility but it does not break K, by Proposition 24, the location of the nearest facility to cK changes. If the former nearest
facility to cK is merged with the new one, the set of good demands remains unaffected but their actual assignment cost
is updated. Otherwise, the set of good demands becomes empty and the algorithm is charged with their ﬁnal assignment
cost. On the other hand, u cannot affect the ﬁnal assignment cost charged to K for outer and bad demands because this
cost is irrevocable.
Therefore, AsgK is equal to the assignment cost charged to the algorithm for the demands in GK ∪ {u} after u’s
assignment minus the actual assignment cost of the demands in GK before u’s arrival. More speciﬁcally,
AsgK =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
du +∑v∈GK dv −∑v∈GK d(v,wK) if G′K = ∅.
The demands in GK become bad and are charged with their ﬁnal assignment cost.
u either is an outer demand or breaks K.
du +∑v∈GK d(v,w′K) −∑v∈GK d(v,wK) if G′K = GK.
The actual assignment cost of the demands in GK is updated.
u is an outer demand.
d(u,w′K) +
∑
v∈GK dv −
∑
v∈GK d(v,wK) if G
′
K = {u}.
The demands in GK become bad and are charged with their
ﬁnal assignment cost. u opens a new facility, is an inner demand, and becomes good.
d(u,w′K) +
∑
v∈GK d(v,w
′
K) −
∑
v∈GK d(v,wK) if G
′
K = GK ∪ {u}.
The actual assignment cost of the demands in GK is updated.
u is an inner demand and becomes good.
(14)
In the analysis ofAsgK above, it may be w′K = wK and the actual assignment cost of good demands does not change.
In the following, Lemma 38 considers the case when u breaks K, Lemma 39 considers the case when u does not
open any new facilities, and Lemma 40 considers the case that u opens a new facility and the location of the nearest
facility to cK changes.
Lemma 38. Let u be a new demand mapped to the isolated active coalition K. If u breaks K, then 	K +AsgK0.
Proof. Since u breaks K, the set of good demands G′K becomes empty. Hence,
AsgK = du +
∑
v∈GK
dv − ∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)7f + 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK).
The second inequality follows from Proposition 18 and Lemma 31. On the other hand,
	K = −7f + ∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK) − 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v
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because K breaks and both 
(1)K and Υ
(I)
K become 0. Putting everything together, we conclude that 	K + AsgK
0. 
Lemma 39. Let u be a new demand mapped to the isolated active coalition K. If no new facilities open and K remains
an isolated active coalition, then 	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u .
Proof. Since K does not break and no new facilities open, the location of the nearest facility to cK does not change
(i.e., w′K = wK ) and no good demands become bad (i.e., GK ⊆ G′K ). Thus, 
(1)K = 0.
If u is an outer demand, then G′K = GK . Since w′K = wK and for every v ∈ GK , d(v,w′K) = d(v,wK), we obtain
that AsgK = du4( + 2)d∗u (Lemma 28). On the other hand, Υ (I)K = 0 because G′K = GK and w′K = wK . We
conclude that 	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u .
If u is an inner demand, by Lemma 27C, u is initially assigned to w′K and becomes a good inner demand. Hence,
G′K = GK ∪ {u} and −Υ (I)K = −d(u,w′K) + 7d∗u (recall that w′K = wK ). On the other hand, AsgK = d(u,w′K).
Therefore, 	K + AsgK = 7d∗u4(+ 2)d∗u . 
Lemma 40. Let u be a new demand mapped to the isolated active coalition K, and let w be the nearest facility to cK
at u’s arrival time. If a new facility w′ opens and K remains an isolated active coalition, then
	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u + 14xAsg∗(Bw). (15)
In addition, for each facility w, the set Bw is charged by (15) at most once.
Proof. We ﬁrst observe that 
(1)K = 0 because K remains an isolated active coalition. Hence, we restrict our attention
to AsgK − Υ (I)K .
Let w = wK be the nearest facility to cK at u’s arrival time. By Proposition 22A, w is mapped to an optimal center
in K. The new facility w′ is also mapped to the isolated active coalition K because w′ is located at the same point as u.
Since w′ does not break K, d(cK,w)D(K), d(cK,w′) < 25d(cK,w), and the location of the nearest facility to cK
changes from wK = w to w′K = w′ (Proposition 24).
Case A: If w is merged with w′, the demands in GK , which were assigned to w, are now assigned to w′. Hence,
they remain assigned to the nearest facility to cK , which is now w′, and no good demands become bad. Therefore,
GK ⊆ G′K .
If u is an outer demand, then G′K = GK . Thus,
AsgK − Υ (I)K =
[
du + ∑
v∈GK
d(v,w′K) −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
−
[ ∑
v∈GK
d(v,w′K) −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
= du.
Applying Lemma 28, we conclude that 	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u .
If u is an inner demand, then it becomes a good demand and G′K = GK ∪ {u}. Therefore,
AsgK − Υ (I)K =
[
d(u,w′K) +
∑
v∈GK
d(v,w′K) −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
−
[
d(u,w′K) − 7d∗u +
∑
v∈GK
d(v,w′K) −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
= 7d∗u.
We conclude that 	K + AsgK7d∗u < 4(+ 2)d∗u .
Case B: If w is not merged with w′, then w is a supported facility (Proposition 13). In this case, the demands in GK
become bad because they are no longer assigned to the nearest facility to cK , which is now w′.
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If u is an outer demand, then G′K = ∅. Therefore,
AsgK − Υ (I)K =
[
du + ∑
v∈GK
dv − ∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
−
[
− ∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK) + 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v
]
= du + ∑
v∈GK
dv − 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v .
If u is an inner demand, then it becomes a good demand and G′K = {u}. Hence,
AsgK − Υ (I)K =
[
d(u,w′K) +
∑
v∈GK
dv − ∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK)
]
−
[
d(u,w′K) − 7d∗u −
∑
v∈GK
d(v,wK) + 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v
]
= 7d∗u +
∑
v∈GK
dv − 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v .
If u is an outer demand, du4(+ 2)d∗u (Lemma 28), while if u is an inner demand, then 7d∗u < 4(+ 2)d∗u . In both
cases,
	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u +
∑
v∈GK
dv − 7 ∑
v∈GK
d∗v < 4(+ 2)d∗u + 4.5f,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 31.
We recall that Bw denotes the set of unsatisﬁed demands contributing their potential to the opening cost of w. Since
w is a supported facility, 3x Asg∗(Bw) = 3x ∑v∈Bw d∗v f . Hence, we can charge an additional term of 4.5f due to
the ﬁnal assignment cost of the good inner demands which become bad to the optimal assignment cost of the demands
in Bw. Thus,
	K + AsgK4(+ 2)d∗u + 14 x Asg∗(Bw).
To conclude the proof, we show that for each facility w, the set Bw is charged with the ﬁnal assignment cost of some
bad demands at most once. For simplicity, if Bw is charged with the ﬁnal assignment cost of some bad demands of an
isolated active coalition K, we say that the facility w is charged by K.
A facility w is charged by an isolated active coalition K only if: (i) w is the nearest facility to cK , (ii) a new facility
w′ mapped to K opens, and (iii) w′ does not break K. By Proposition 22A, the nearest facility to the representative of
an isolated active coalition is mapped to an optimal center in the coalition. Therefore, w is mapped to an optimal center
in K and cannot be the nearest facility to the representative of any other isolated coalition K ′ which is disjoint from K.
Consequently, the facility w cannot be charged by any coalition K ′ ⊆ F ∗ \ K . Moreover, by Proposition 25, if: (i) w
is the nearest facility to cK , (ii) a new facility w′ mapped to K opens, and (iii) w′ does not break K, then w can never
become again the nearest facility to any of the optimal centers in K. Hence, once w has been charged by the isolated
coalition K, it cannot be charged again by K or any subset/descendant of K in the hierarchical decomposition K. 
4.6.5. Non-isolated active coalitions
Each new demand u mapped to a non-isolated active coalition K is irrevocably charged with its ﬁnal assignment cost
at its assignment time. Hence, AsgK = du. On the other hand, for every active coalition K ′, K 
= K ′, AsgK ′ = 0.
More speciﬁcally, if K ′ is a non-isolated active coalition, then u cannot affect the irrevocable ﬁnal assignment cost
which has been charged to the algorithm for the demands mapped to K ′, while if K ′ is an isolated active coalition, the
claim follows from Lemma 37.
Lemma 41. Let u be a new demand mapped to the non-isolated active coalition K. Then,
	K + AsgK = 	K + du4((+ 1)2 + 2)d∗u.
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Proof. We ﬁrst observe that the demand u cannot change the value of Υ (I)K because K is a non-isolated active coalition
when u arrives. Hence we restrict our attention to 
(1)K + 
(2)K − Υ (N)K + du.
In the following, let NK be the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands of K at u’s arrival time, and let N′K be the set of
unsatisﬁed inner demands of K at u’s assignment time. We distinguish between the following three cases:
Case A: Either N′K ⊂ NK or K becomes isolated or broken. In other words, either g′(cK) < DN(K) or a new
facility w′ opens and Bw′ ∩ NK 
= ∅. In both cases, some of the demands in NK are no longer included in N′K .
The value of Υ (N)K does not exceed 5( + 4)2f at u’s arrival time (Lemma 34) and remains nonnegative at u’s
assignment time. Hence, the increase in the function −Υ (N)K is −Υ (N)K 5(+4)2f . In addition, du cannot exceed
2.5f (Proposition 18).
On the other hand, if u makes K either isolated or broken, the function 
(1)K decreases by [5( + 4)2 + 2.5]f .
Otherwise, a new facility w′ opens and its neighborhood Bw′ intersects NK ⊆ inN(K). By Proposition 35, the
conﬁguration distance of cK decreases by a factor greater than 3, namely, g′(cK) < 13g(cK). Since g(cK) < ( + 1)
2DN(K), because K is an active coalition before u’s arrival, and g′(cK)DN(K), because K remains a non-isolated
active coalition after u’s assignment, the function 
(2)K decreases by more than [5( + 4)2 + 2.5]f . In both cases,

(1)K + 
(2)K  − [5(+ 4)2 + 2.5]f . Therefore,
	K + du =
(1)K + 
(2)K − Υ (N)K + du − [5(+ 4)2 + 2.5]f + 5(+ 4)2f + 2.5f 0.
Case B: N′K = NK and K remains a non-isolated active coalition. We distinguish between the case when u is an
outer demand and the case when u is an inner demand.
If u is an outer demand, du4 [( + 1)2 + 2] d∗u (Lemma 32). Let  = g(cK)g′(cK)1 be the factor by which g(cK)
decreases because of u. Since Υ (N)K 5( + 4)2f (Lemma 34), the increase in the function −Υ (N)K is bounded
by 5(1 − 1 )( + 4)2f . On the other hand, the function 
(2)K decreases by ln()(5( + 4)2 + 2.5)f , because
g(cK) < (+ 1)2DN(K), since K is an active coalition before u’s arrival, and g′(cK)DN(K), since K remains a
non-isolated active coalition after u’s assignment. Using ln()(1 − 1 ), for every 1, we conclude that
	K + du4 [(+ 1)2 + 2] d∗u.
We treat the case when u is an inner demand similarly to Case A. Since u has become satisﬁed and is not included
in N′K , a new facility w′ located at the same point as u opens. By Proposition 35, the conﬁguration distance of cK
decreases by a factor greater than 3 becauseBw′ intersects inN(K) at u. Similarly toCaseA, du2.5f (Proposition 18),
−Υ (N)K 5(+ 4)2f (Lemma 34), and 
(2)K  − [5(+ 4)2 + 2.5]f . Therefore, 	K + du0.
Case C: N′K = NK ∪ {u} and K remains a non-isolated active coalition. Then, u is an inner demand which remains
unsatisﬁed at its assignment time. By Lemma 33, du5 g′(cK).
Let  = g(cK)
g′(cK)1 be the factor by which g(cK) decreases because of u. Similarly to Case B,

(2)K = − ln()(5(+ 4)2 + 2.5)f  −
(
1 − 1

)
[5(+ 4)2 + 2.5]f.
On the other hand, the function −Υ (N)K increases by at most 5(1− 1 )(+ 4)2f because g(cK) decreases by a factor
of , and decreases by 5g′(cK), because u is added to the set of unsatisﬁed inner demands of K. Putting everything
together, we obtain that
	K + du =
(2)K − Υ (N)K + du −
(
1 − 1

)
[5(+ 4)2 + 2.5]f
+ 5
(
1 − 1

)
(+ 4)2f − 5 g′(cK) + 5 g′(cK).
Therefore, 	K + du0. 
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Then, we prove that the potential function 	K cannot increase due to a new demand which is not mapped to the
non-isolated active coalition K.
Lemma 42. Let K be a non-isolated active coalition when a new demand u arrives. If u is not mapped to K, then
AsgK = 0 and 	K0.
Proof. We ﬁrst recall that AsgK = 0 because u is not mapped to K and K is only charged with an irrevocable
assignment cost for the demands mapped to it because it is a non-isolated active coalition.
To show that 	K cannot increase due to u’s arrival, we work similarly to the proof of Lemma 41. There are some
differences which only make the proof simpler. First of all, we have to bound 	K instead of 	K + du. In addition,
since u is not mapped to K, we do not have to consider the case when N′K = NK ∪ {u} and in Case B, the possibility
that u could have been added to NK (u is an inner demand). 
4.6.6. Concluding the proof of Theorem 1
To conclude the potential function argument, we bound 	+ Asg for each new demand u.
Let u be a new demand mapped to an active coalition K. By Lemmas 37 and 42, u cannot affect the cost charged to
the remaining active coalitions. Therefore, Asg = AsgK .
If K is an isolated active coalition, then AsgK is given by (14). We bound 	K + AsgK using Lemma 38 if
u breaks K, Lemma 39 if u does not open any new facilities, or Lemma 40 otherwise. If K is a non-isolated active
coalition, then AsgK = du and we bound 	K + AsgK using Lemma 41.
For any other K ′ ∈ K, K ′ 
= K , 	K ′ = 0 if K ′ is not an active coalition when u arrives, 	K ′ = 0 if K ′ is
an isolated active coalition when u arrives (Lemma 37), and 	K ′0 if K ′ is a non-isolated active coalition when u
arrives (Lemma 42).
Therefore, for every j, 1jn, the actual assignment cost of the algorithm just after the demand uj has been
considered is
Asgj 2 ln(32)[5(+ 4)2 + 3]Fac∗ + [4((+ 1)2 + 2) + 14x]
j∑
i=1
d∗ui .
In the analysis of non-isolated active coalitions, we can divide the interval [ DN(K), ( + 1)2DN(K) ) into sub-
intervals [ 2iDN(K), 2i+1DN(K) ), i = 0, . . . ,
⌈
log((1 + 1 )2)
⌉
, and consider different phases according to the
sub-interval g(cK) belongs to. Applying this standard approach carefully, we can improve the previous upper bound to
Asgj 4 log()[12(+ 2) + 3]Fac∗ + (+ 2)(8+ 25)
j∑
i=1
d∗ui .
5. An incremental algorithm for k-Median
In this section, we show how IFL can be used to obtain an incremental algorithm for k-Median which achieves a
constant performance ratio and uses only O(k) medians. Our approach is quite general and can be used with essentially
any incremental algorithm for Facility Location which achieves a constant performance ratio.
The basic idea is to exploit the intrinsic similarity between Facility Location and k-Median. More speciﬁcally, we use
the fact that every feasible solution for an instance of k-Median can be regarded as a feasible solution for the instance
of Facility Location consisting of the same set of demands. Moreover, if the facility cost is chosen appropriately, the
cost of the solution for the Facility Location instance is within a small constant factor of the cost of the solution for the
original k-Median instance (see e.g. [5,9,14,20]). The following lemma formalizes the aforementioned intuition. We
recall that a1, a2, b1, and b2 denote the constants in the performance ratio of IFL.
Lemma 43. Let Asg∗ be the optimal assignment cost for an instance of k-Median, and let  = a2
b2
. For any  > 0,
IFL with facility cost f = k maintains a solution of cost no greater than (a2 + b2)Asg∗ + b2  which consists of no
more than (a1 + a2 b1b2
Asg∗
 )k medians.
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Proof. We recall that given an add-optimal facility conﬁguration of facility cost Fac∗o and assignment cost Asg∗o,
IFL maintains a solution of facility cost a1 Fac∗o + b1 Asg∗o and assignment cost a2 Fac∗o + b2 Asg∗o, where a1 = 1,
a2 = 2 ln(32)(5(+ 4)2 + 3), b1 = 3x , and b2 = 4((+ 1)2 + 2) + 14x.
Let F ∗ be a k-Median conﬁguration of cost Asg∗. By the analysis of IFL, the medians in F ∗ need not be restricted
to the demand locations. The k-Median instance can be regarded as an instance of Facility Location with facility cost
f = k , where  = a2b2 . Then, F ∗ is a facility conﬁguration of facility cost Fac∗ =  and assignment cost Asg∗. If F ∗
is not add-optimal, there is a set of facilities whose addition to F ∗ makes it add-optimal without increasing its cost.
Let F ∗o , F ∗ ⊆ F ∗o , be the add-optimal facility conﬁguration corresponding to F ∗, let Fac∗o be the facility cost,
and let Asg∗o be the assignment cost of F ∗o . It is the case that: (i) Fac∗o + Asg∗oFac∗ + Asg∗, (ii) Asg∗oAsg∗, (iii)
Fac∗oFac∗ + Asg∗, and (iv) for every 0ab, aFac∗o + bAsg∗oaFac∗ + bAsg∗, where the last claim follows from
(i), (ii), and F ∗ ⊆ F ∗o .
Let Fac be the facility cost and Asg be the assignment cost of the solution maintained by IFL. Since a1b1,
Faca1 Fac∗o + b1 Asg∗oa1 Fac∗ + b1 Asg∗a1


+ b1 Asg∗.
Using f = k and  = a2b2 , we obtain that IFL’s solution consists of no more than (a1 + a2
b1
b2
Asg∗
 )k medians. As for
the assignment cost,
Asga2 Fac∗o + b2 Asg∗oa2
(


+ Asg∗
)
+ b2 Asg∗(a2 + b2)Asg∗ + b2 . 
The incremental algorithm for k-Median operates in phases. Using an estimated upper bound  on the optimal cost,
the current phase determines a facility cost and invokes the incremental algorithm for Facility Location. When either
the algorithm’s assignment cost or the number of facilities exceed the bounds of Lemma 43, the algorithm obtains a
certiﬁcate that the optimal cost is greater than. Then, the algorithm increases the estimated upper bound by a constant
factor and proceeds with the next phase. This is the doubling approach used in online load balancing (see e.g. [3,
Chapter 12]). The same approach is also used in the incremental algorithms for k-Center [4] and Sum k-Radius [6],
and in the streaming algorithm for k-Median of [7].
5.1. A deterministic incremental algorithm for k-Median
The algorithm IM(k) (Fig. 4) starts in phase 0, which is called the initialization phase, with an estimated upper bound
0 = 0 and the corresponding facility cost f0 = 0. An invocation of IFL with facility cost 0 simply opens a new
facility at each different demand location. Hence, the initialization phase ends as soon as IFL0 has considered exactly
k + 1 different demand locations. Since there is a median at each of them, the algorithm incurs no assignment cost in
the initialization phase.
Each phase i, i1, starts by merging the medians produced by the last phase with the medians produced by the
previous phases. Thus, we ensure that the total number of medians in the current solution does not depend on the
number of phases. More speciﬁcally, for each median w in the current solution, we maintain its weight |C(w)|, which
is equal to the number of demands currently assigned to w. At the beginning of phase i, the set F i−2 consisting of the
weighted medians produced by phases 0, . . . , i − 2 is merged with the set Fi−1 consisting of the weighted medians
produced by phase i − 1. We can use any bicriteria (c1, c2)-approximation algorithm for k-Median (e.g. the algorithm
of [17] for c1 = 32 and c2 = 1 in O(k2 log n) time or IM(k)) to merge the medians in F i−2 with the medians in
Fi−1. The resulting set F i−1 consists of no more than c2k weighted medians, namely, the medians produced by phases
0, . . . , i − 1. Mi−1 denotes the cost of assigning the weighted medians in F i−2 ∪ Fi−1 to the medians in F i−1.
The upper bound i which characterizes phase i is set to the maximum of i−1 and Mi−1, where  is a constant
chosen sufﬁciently large. After initializing the invocation of IFL corresponding to phase i, denoted by IFLi , IM(k)
starts considering new demands. IFLi incorporates each new demand into the current solution and updates its median
conﬁguration, denoted by Fi , and its assignment cost for the demands considered in phase i, denoted by Ai . If either
Fi contains more than k medians or the assignment cost Ai exceeds i , phase i ends. The algorithm places a new
median at the location of the last demand of each phase instead of letting IFLi incorporate it into the current solution.
Hence, the algorithm maintains the invariant that |Fi |k + 1 and Aii .
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Fig. 4. The algorithm Incremental k-Median (IM(k)).
5.1.1. Notation
Let R(i) denote the set of demands considered in phase i. If phase i is the current phase, R(i) is the set of demands
considered from the beginning of the phase up to the present time. Let R(i) = ⋃i=0 R(). If i is a complete phase,
R(i) is the set of the demands considered up to the end of phase i, while if i is the current phase, R(i) consists of the
demands considered by the algorithm so far. Let OPTi denote the cost of the optimal solution on R(i).
5.1.2. Analysis
As long as IM(k) is in phase i, the current solution consists of the weighted medians in F i−1 ∪ Fi . The algorithm
maintains the invariant that the number of medians in F i−1 ∪ Fi is no greater than ( + c2)k + 1. The following
proposition establishes that Asgi = Asgi−1 + Mi−1 + Ai is an upper bound on the cost incurred by the algorithm for
the demands considered so far.
Proposition 44. For every phase i, Asgi is an upper bound on the cost of F i−1 ∪ Fi on R(i).
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on i. For the initialization phase, the proposition holds because IFL0 is
invoked with facility cost f0 = 0. Hence, F0 contains a median at each different demand location and the algorithm’s
cost is Asg0 = 0. We inductively assume that Asgi−1 is an upper bound on the cost of F i−2 ∪ Fi−1 on R(i − 1).
Then, the cost of assigning R(i − 1) to the medians in F i−1 is at most Asgi−1 + Mi−1, namely, the cost of moving
the demands in R(i − 1) from their original locations to the medians in F i−2 ∪ Fi−1 and then to the medians in F i−1.
In addition, the cost of assigning the demands in R(i) to the medians in Fi is Ai . Therefore, Asgi , which is deﬁned as
Asgi−1 + Mi−1 + Ai , is indeed an upper bound on the cost of F i−1 ∪ Fi on R(i). 
To establish the algorithm’s performance ratio, we prove that the algorithm’s cost up to the end of phase i does not
exceed i (Lemma 45), while for every complete phase i, the optimal cost for the demands considered up to the end
of phase i is at least max{i , Mi2c1(+1) } (Lemmas 46 and 47).
Lemma 45. Let + 2. Then, for every phase i, Asgiii+1.
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on i. For the initialization phase, the lemma holds because Asg0 =
001. We inductively assume that the lemma holds until the end of phase i, i0. Then, until the end of
phase i + 1,
Asgi+1 = Asgi + Mi + Ai+1i + Mi + i+1(+ 2)i+1i+1i+2.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis and the invariant Ai+1i+1, the second inequality from
i+1 = max{i ,Mi}, and the third inequality from + 2. 
Lemma 46. Let a1 + a2 b1b2 and a2 + 2b2. For every complete phase i, OPTi > i .
Proof. For the initialization phase, the lemma holds because OPT0 > 0 = 0. Let us assume that for some complete
phase i, OPTii . Let OPT′i be the optimal cost for the demands considered in phase i. Then OPT′iOPTii . By
Lemma 43, IFLi would maintain a solution consisting of no more than (a1 + a2 b1b2 )kk medians and costing at most
(a2 + 2b2)ii . This contradicts the hypothesis that phase i is complete. 
Lemma 47. For every complete phase i, Mi2c1(+ 1)OPTi .
Proof. The optimal solution on R(i) suggests a way of merging the weighted medians in F i−1 ∪Fi into k medians. In
particular, we can assign each weighted median in F i−1 ∪ Fi to the nearest optimal median. Similarly to the proof of
[11, Theorem 2.3], we can show that this assignment costs no more than Asgi + OPTi , namely, the cost of moving the
demands back to their original locations and then to the optimal medians. Consequently, we can merge the weighted
medians in F i−1 ∪ Fi into k medians at a cost no greater than Asgi + OPTii + OPTi(+ 1)OPTi , where the
ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 45 and the second inequality from Lemma 46. This solution can be transformed to
a solution which uses medians only in F i−1 ∪ Fi and costs at most 2 (+ 1)OPTi (see e.g. [11, Theorem 2.1]). Since
F i is computed by a bicriteria (c1, c2)-approximation algorithm for k-Median, Mi , namely, the cost of assigning the
weighted medians in F i−1 ∪ Fi to the medians in F i , cannot exceed 2c1(+ 1)OPTi . 
Combining the previous lemmas, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 48. The algorithm IM(k) achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k) medians.
Proof. The number ofmedians in the current solution never exceeds (a1+a2 b1b2 +c2)k+1. To establish the performance
ratio, we boundAsgi from above. By Proposition 44, Asgi is an upper bound on the actual cost incurred by the algorithm
for the demands considered so far.
In the initialization phase, OPT0 > 0 = Asg0 . Let i0 be the last complete phase. By Lemmas 46 and 47,
OPTi max{i , Mi2c1(+1) }. On the other hand, the algorithm’s cost is at most Asgi+1i+1 (Lemma 45). If i+1 =
i , then Asgi+12OPTi . If i+1 = Mi , then Asgi+12c1( + 1)OPTi . For  + 2 and a2 + 2b2, the
performance ratio of IM(k) is less than 2c1(a2 + 2b2 + 3)2.
Before we determine the complexity of the algorithm, we observe that it is straightforward to modify IM(k) so as to
ensure that no phase ends before it considers at least k + 1 new demands. Hence, we can assume that the number of
phases is O( n
k
).
The algorithm IM(k) runs in O(n2k) time and O(n) space. More speciﬁcally, computing F i from F i−1 ∪ Fi at the
beginning of phase i takes O(k2 log n) time (e.g. one can use the algorithm of [17]) and there are O( n
k
) phases. In
addition, IFL needs O(nk) time to incorporate each new demand into the current solution. The bound on the space
complexity is trivial, since it implies that every demand is stored in the main memory. 
5.2. A randomized incremental algorithm for k-Median
In this section, we present the randomized version of the incremental algorithm for k-Median which improves on the
time and space complexity of the deterministic version. The algorithm RIM(k) (Fig. 5) uses randomization to generate
a modiﬁed instance which can be represented in a space efﬁcient manner. The modiﬁed instance contains the same
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Fig. 5. The algorithm Randomized Incremental k-Median (RIM(k)).
number of unit demands, which now occupy only O(k log2 n) different locations. Then, RIM(k) uses IFL to cluster the
modiﬁed instance.
More speciﬁcally, each new demand is ﬁrst moved to a gathering point by the randomized algorithm Gather (Fig. 6).
Then, a new demand located at the corresponding gathering point is given to IFL, which assigns it to a median. Both
actions are completed before the next demand is considered. The current phase ends if either the number of gathering
points, the gathering cost, the number of medians, or the assignment cost on the modiﬁed instance become too large.
We should emphasize that IFL treats the demands moved to the same gathering point by Gather as different demands
and may put them in different clusters. 5 In other words, the output of Gather is regarded as a sample taken from the
points of the metric space and not as a ﬁrst-level clustering. This sample is only used to improve the time and space
efﬁciency of IFL. On the other hand, the solution produced by IFL on the modiﬁed instance can be directly translated
into a hierarchical clustering of the original instance.
Apart from the use of Gather, the description and the analysis of RIM(k) are similar to those of IM(k), Section 5.1.
In the following, we use the notation introduced in the previous section with exactly the same meaning.
5.2.1. The analysis of Gather
The algorithm Gather can be thought of as the incremental version of PARA_CLUSTER [7]. It is made up of O(log n)
independent invocations of Meyerson’s randomized algorithm for Online Facility Location [18], denoted by ROFL.
In phase i, Gatheri invokes ROFLi with facility cost fˆi = ik(log n+1) . The jth invocation of ROFLi , denoted by
ROFLi (j), maintains its own set of gathering points, denoted by Gi(j), and its individual cost, denoted by AGi (j).
For each new demand u, ROFLi (j) places a new gathering point at u’s location with probability min{ d(Gi(j),u)
fˆi
, 1}.
Otherwise, itmoves u to the nearest gathering point inGi(j). ROFLi (j) fails as soon as either the number of its gathering
5 This increases the algorithm’s time and space complexity by a factor of k.
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Fig. 6. Gathering the original demands in O(k log2 n) points.
points exceeds 20k (log n+ 1) or its individual cost exceeds 20i . After ROFLi (j) has failed, it stops considering new
demands.
Gatheri maintains the union of the sets of gathering points, denoted by Gi , and the corresponding gathering cost,
denoted by AGi . For each new demand u, Gatheri places a new gathering point at u’s location if at least one of the
invocations ROFLi (j) does so. Otherwise, it moves u to the nearest gathering point in Gi . Gatheri fails as soon as all
the invocations ROFLi (j) have failed.
Lemma 49. Gatheri (i , k, log n, t) maintains a collection of no more than 20kt (log n+1)2 gathering points and the
corresponding gathering cost does not exceed 20i .
Proof. The set of gathering points Gi is equal to the union of the sets Gi(j) maintained by the independent invocations
ROFLi (j), j = 1, . . . , t log n. The cardinality of each Gi(j) cannot exceed 20k (log n + 1) + 1, because as soon
as |Gi(j)| becomes greater than 20k (log n + 1), ROFLi (j) fails and stops considering new demands. In addition,
the location of the last demand, namely, the demand making Gatheri fail, is also added to Gi . Hence, the number of
gathering points maintained by Gatheri (i , k, log n, t) is upper bounded by
[20k (log n + 1) + 1] t log n + 120kt (log n + 1)2.
As long as Gatheri does not fail, the gathering cost AGi is upper bounded by the cost A
G
i (j) of any invocation
ROFLi (j) which has not failed yet. This is true because Gatheri moves each new demand to the nearest gathering
point in Gi and Gi(j) ⊆ Gi . Hence, as long as there exists an invocation ROFLi (j) which has not failed yet, it
AGi AGi (j)20i . In addition, Gatheri places a gathering point at the location of the last demand and incurs no
gathering cost for it. 
The following lemma is proven in [7] using the technique of [18].
Lemma 50 (Charikar et al. [7, Lemma 1]). Let Asg∗ be the optimal assignment cost for an instance of k-Median
consisting of no more than n unit demands, and let  be any positive number. With probability at least 12 , ROFL with
facility cost f = 
k(log n+1) maintains a solution consisting of no more than 4k (log n + 1)(1 + 4Asg
∗
 ) medians and
costing at most 4(+ 4Asg∗).
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Lemma 51. Let Asg∗ be the optimal assignment cost for an instance of k-Median consisting of no more than n unit
demands, let  be an upper bound on Asg∗, and let t be a positive constant. Then, with probability at least 1 − n−t ,
Gather(, k, log n, t) does not fail on this instance.
Proof. The algorithm Gather fails only if all the independent invocations ROFL(j) fail. For every j, j = 1, . . . , t log n,
ROFL(j) fails only if either |G(j)| > 20k(log n+1) or AG(j) > 20. SinceAsg∗, by Lemma 50, the probability
that ROFL(j) fails on this instance is at most 12 . Since the invocations of ROFL are independent from each other, the
probability that all of them fail on this instance is at most n−t . 
5.2.2. The analysis of RIM(k)
Similarly to IM(k), we can assume that RIM(k) operates in O( n
k
) phases. RIM(k) maintains a solution consisting
of no more than ( + c2) k + 1 medians. Similarly to Proposition 44, we can prove that for every phase i, Asgi =
Asgi−1 + Mi−1 + AGi + Ai is an upper bound on the cost incurred by the algorithm for the demands considered
so far.
To establish the performance ratio of RIM(k), we prove that the total algorithm’s cost up to the end of phase i cannot
exceed i (Lemma 52), while for every complete phase i, OPTi is at least max{i , Mi2c1(+1) } whp (Lemmas 53
and 54).
Lemma 52. Let + 22. Then, for every phase i, Asgiii+1.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on i. For the initialization phase, the lemma holds because no gathering takes
place and Asg0 = 001. We inductively assume that the lemma holds until the end of phase i, i0. Then, until
the end of phase i + 1,
Asgi+1 = Asgi + Mi + AGi+1 + Ai+1i + Mi + 20i+1 + i+1(+ 22)i+1i+1i+2.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis, the invariant AGi+120i+1 maintained by Gatheri (Lemma
49), and the invariant Ai+1i+1 maintained by RIM(k) in phase i. The second inequality follows from i+1 =
max{i ,Mi}, and the third inequality from + 22. 
Lemma 53. Let a1 + 21a2 b1b2 , 21a2 + 22b2, and let i be a complete phase. With probability at least 1 − n−t ,
OPTi > i .
Proof. For the initialization phase, the lemma holds with certainty because OPT0 > 0 = 0. Let us assume that
for some complete phase i, OPTii . Let OPT′i be the optimal cost for the demands considered in phase i. Then
OPT′iOPTii .
By Lemma 51, the probability that phase i ends because Gatheri fails is at most n−t . On the other hand, if OPT′ii
and Gatheri does not fail, phase i cannot end because of IFLi (see also the proof of Lemma 46). More speciﬁcally, let us
assume that Gatheri does not fail and phase i ends because either |Fi | > k or Ai > i . By Lemma 49, the gathering
cost AGi is at most 20i . Hence, for the modiﬁed instance considered by IFLi , there exists a k-Median solution of cost
no greater than AGi + OPT′i21i , namely, the solution obtained by moving the demands in R(i) from the gathering
points to their original locations and then to the optimal medians. We also recall that IFLi treats the demands moved
to the same gathering point by Gatheri as different unit demands. By Lemma 43, the solution produced by IFLi on the
modiﬁed instance consists of no more than (a1 + 21a2 b1b2 )kk medians and costs at most (21a2 + 22b2)ii .
In other words, if OPT′ii and Gatheri does not fail, phase i cannot end because of IFLi . Therefore, the probability
that OPTii and phase i ends is at most n−t . 
Lemma 54. Let i be a complete phase. If OPTii , then
Mi2c1(+ 1)OPTi .
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Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Lemma 47. 
We are now ready to establish the main result of this section.
Theorem 55. RIM(k) runs in O(nk2 log2 n) time and O(k2 log2 n) space and achieves a constant performance ratio
whp using O(k) medians.
Proof. The number of medians in the current solution never exceeds (a1 +21a2 b1b2 + c2) k+1. As for the performance
ratio, in the initialization phase, OPT0 > 0 = Asg0 . Let i + 1, i0, be the current phase, and let i be the last complete
phase. The algorithm’s cost is at most Asgi+1i+1 (Lemma 52). Given that OPTii , we distinguish between
i+1 = i andi+1 = Mi . In the former case, Asgi+12 OPTi , while in the latter case, Asgi+12c1(+1)OPTi
(Lemma 54).
Let t2. By Lemma 53 and since there are O( n
k
) complete phases, the probability that there exists a complete phase
i such that OPTi < i is at most n−t+1. For + 22 and 21a2 + 22b2, the performance ratio of RIM(k) is less
than 2c1[22(a2 + b2 + 1)]2 with probability at least 1 − n−t+1.
The algorithm RIM(k) runs in O(nk2 log2 n) time and O(k2 log2 n) space. More speciﬁcally, computing F i from
F i−1 ∪ Fi at the beginning of phase i takes O(k2 log n) time and there are O( nk ) phases. In addition, Gather needs
O(k log2 n) time tomove each new demand to the nearest gathering point and IFL needsO(k2 log2 n) time to incorporate
each new demand (of the modiﬁed instance) into the current solution. As for the space complexity, Gather can be
implemented in O(k log2 n) space and IFL can be implemented in O(k2 log2 n) space. 
6. Open problems
An intriguing open problem is to determine whether there exists a time and space efﬁcient incremental algorithm for
k-Median which does not assume any advanced knowledge of n and achieves a constant performance ratio using O(k)
medians.
Another interesting research direction is to improve the constants involved in the performance ratio of IFL. For
isolated coalitions, the performance ratio can be signiﬁcantly improved by a careful analysis. However, it is the analysis
of non-isolated coalitions which increases the performance ratio by a large additive term. In addition to a really
careful analysis, some new ideas concerning non-isolated coalitions are required for establishing a performance ratio of
practical interest.Also, itwould be interesting to investigate howmuch randomization can improve the performance ratio
of IFL.
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